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Counsel to a foreign investment fund, or to the sponsor of such a fund, that
intends to offer its shares publicly in the United States must be prepared to
confront a host of legal obstacles.1 The most frequently cited impediment, sec-
tion 7(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act),2 prohibits the offer
and sale of shares of most foreign investment companies in the United States.
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Internal Revenue Code may
present other serious obstacles. This article examines the most significant legal
impediments to the entry of foreign funds into the United States and attempts to
determine which are the most obstinate barriers. The article undertakes this
examination by way of a regulatory model, the European Community's Directive
on Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS
Directive).
The UCITS Directive has rekindled efforts to examine and, if possible, to
remove barriers to the cross-border movement of investment funds.4 The Direc-
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Commission. In 1986 and 1987 he served as adviser to the Commission of the European Commu-
nities.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any
private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues on
the staff of the Commission. The article is current as of April 10, 1992.
**The Editorial Reviewer for this article was Susan Harris Mauldin.
1. Among the potential legal obstacles that are beyond the scope of this article are state blue sky
laws and the federal banking laws. A fund also must overcome other problems, such as the costs of
marketing the fund's shares in the United States, which are not addressed in this article.
2. Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to
80a-52 [hereinafter 1940 Act].
3. Council Directive 85/611 of 20 December 1985 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable
Securities (UCITS), 1985 O.J. (L.375) 3 [hereinafter UCITS Directive].
4. See, e.g., Investment Company Act Release No. 17534, 46 SEC Docket 875, 879 (1990)
[hereinafter Study Release]; The Implications of "Europe 1992" for the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry,
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tive generally defines UCITS as redeemable collective investment vehicles that
hold certain types of securities. UCITS are thus similar to diversified open-end
mutual funds issued in the United States. The Directive facilitates the intra-
European offering of mutual funds by generally requiring that each EC Member
State permit the offer and sale within its borders of any UCITS that have been
authorized by another Member State.5
Some believe that the Directive will open the European investment market to
U.S. funds. 6 They reason that if a U.S. open-end fund establishes itself in a
Member State (or a territory of a Member State) such as Luxembourg, Ireland,
Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means 4 (Jan. 30, 1990) (statement of David
Silver, Pres., Investment Company Institute).
On the same day that the European Community adopted the UCITS Directive, it also amended its
Directive concerning the liberalization of capital movements in the Community. Council Directive of
20 December 1985 amending the Directive of 11 May 1960 on the implementation of Article 67 of
the Treaty, No. 85/583, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 39. In this amendment, the Community added UCITS
governed by the UCITS Directive to the list of capital items whose movement was liberalized by the
Directive of 11 May 1960. Id. The Directive states that "retention of ... restrictions [on the free
movement of units] would substantially reduce the effects of those provisions of [the UCITS]
Directive which relate to the marketing of the units . I... "d  at prefacatory statement. Without the
amendment Member States could have imposed exchange rate restrictions on UCITS marketed in
their territory. See Van Damme, infra note 79, at VIII. In 1988, the Community adopted a capital
liberalization directive to replace the Directive of 11 May 1960. Council Directive of 24 June 1988
for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, No. 88/361, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5. This Directive
generally expands the application of the Community's liberalization to most types of units of col-
lective investment undertakings. Id. at Annex I, Part IV.
There are twelve Member States in the European Community [hereinafter EC], Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal, and Spain. The UCITS Directive, like other EC directives, instructs the twelve EC Member
States to implement the directive through national legislation by a specified date. Ten of the Member
States were required to implement the UCITS Directive by October 1, 1989. The two most recently
admitted states, Greece and Portugal, were instructed to implement the Directive by April 1, 1992.
Of the ten Member States required to implement the Directive by October 1, 1989, all but Italy have
done so.
The European Community and the seven members of the European Free Trade Association (Aus-
tria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) [hereinafter EFTA] have
agreed to form the European Economic Area, [hereinafter EEA] which will generally extend the
single market in capital, services, labor, and most goods to the whole EEA as of January 1, 1993,
the target date for the establishment of that market in the EC. See EUROCOM, MONTHLY BULLETIN
OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL NEWS, Nov. 1991. The treaty must be ratified
by the 19 EEA member countries and the European Parliament. Id. Under the treaty, new EC rules
would be extended to the EFTA members only upon the approval of an EEA Council of Ministers.
5. As discussed more fully below, host Member States may prohibit offers and sales of UCITS
established in another member state if the UCITS does not comply with certain provisions of the
Directive or with the laws of the host Member State that do not fall within the field of the Directive.
See infra text accompanying notes 11-15.
Although one purpose of the Directive is to promote "the free circulation" of UCITS "in the
Community," see UCITS Directive, supra note 3 at prefacatory statement, the Directive generally
applies to any UCITS, even if it is marketed only in the Member State in which it is situated. See
UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § I, art. I (Member States must apply the Directive to UCITS
situated in their territories). But see id. art. 2 (describing UCITS that are not subject to the Directive).
6. See, e.g., Mutual Fund Firms Eye Europe 1992, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Oct. 16,
1989, at 45-46.
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or even Gibraltar, with relatively liberal regulation, the UCITS Directive would
permit the fund to offer its shares in all of the other Member States without
requiring separate authorization. This "single passport" would open up all of
Europe to non-European funds.
This analysis tends to understate the significance of other barriers to entry into
the European market, such as European tax and marketing regulation, which the
UCITS Directive does not remove.7 Moreover, the withholding and current
distribution rules in the Internal Revenue Code may discourage foreign owner-
ship of U.S. investment company shares.8 Although the UCITS Directive facil-
itates the offer of funds throughout Europe, the opportunities available to non-
European funds are still limited.
Some also have suggested that the system of mutual recognition established by
the Directive could be a basis for negotiation between the United States and
Europe. 9 These commentators reason that the mutual recognition by the United
States and the Community of regulation under the 1940 Act and the Directive
could facilitate the offering of fund shares between Europe and the United States.
This argument tends to underestimate another problem: the difficulty of negoti-
ating an arrangement with the European Community when the Community has
exclusive jurisdiction over some issues, each Member State has exclusive juris-
diction over others, and the Community and the Member States share authority
over still others.l
0
Today the UCITS Directive may be most useful to test U.S. barriers to entry
of foreign funds. Many publicly held, European open-end funds could be ex-
pected to qualify as UCITS. Consequently, an examination of the barriers that
UCITS would confront when offering their shares in the United States has broad
applicability. Consideration of these obstacles would reveal the more intractable
ones and would clarify the steps necessary to permit greater access by foreign
funds into U.S. markets.
Part I of this article identifies the most significant regulatory impediments to
the sale of UCITS in the United States. Part I.A. examines the most frequently
criticized barrier to entry, section 7(d) of the 1940 Act. Part I.B. compares the
UCITS Directive to the 1940 Act and identifies those incongruities that would
impede entry into the U.S. market even if section 7(d) were amended. Part I.C.
examines other impediments to the sale of UCITS in the United States that exist
in the Investment Advisers Act and in the Internal Revenue Code. Part II concludes
that, although section 7(d) does prohibit the offer and sale of securities issued by
most foreign investment companies in the United States, other provisions in the
7. See generally infra text accompanying notes 16-53.
8. See Study Release, supra note 4, at 877.
9. See, e.g., Comments of the Investment Company Institute on the Reform of Regulation of
Investment Companies 66-67 (Oct. 5, 1990) (copy on file at the SEC).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 70-72 (discussing problems of negotiation with the EC).
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1940 Act, the Investment Advisers Act, and the Internal Revenue Code would
effectively prevent those offers and sales even if section 7(d) were repealed. The
article suggests that so-called "mirror" funds would continue to be the only
vehicle for entry into the U.S. market even if section 7(d) were repealed.
I. UCITS
A. SECTION 7(D) OF THE 1940 ACT
1. Description of Section 7(d)
Section 7(d) of the 1940 Act generally prohibits the public offer or sale
through interstate commerce of investment companies not organized or otherwise
created under the laws of the United States or any state." Section 7(d) does
authorize the SEC to permit a foreign investment company to register in the
United States and to publicly offer its shares through interstate commerce if the
11. Section 7(a) of the 1940 Act, supra note 2, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(a), generally requires only
investment companies organized or created under federal or state law to register under § 8, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-8, before offering, selling or redeeming any security, engaging in any business in interstate
commerce, or conducting certain other activities.
The SEC has taken the position that a foreign bank or insurance company may be considered to
be an "investment company" as defined by § 3(a) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a), if it is
involved in owning, holding, trading, investing, or reinvesting in securities and if it intends to offer
or sell its securities in the United States. See, e.g., Investment Company Act Release No. 17682, 55
Fed. Reg. 34,569 (1990) (proposing amendments to rule 6c-9). The SEC reasons that such banks and
insurance companies are deemed to be investment companies under § 3(a)(1) and § 3(a)(3) of the
1940 Act. Id. at 34,570. Section 3(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3), excludes banks and insurance
companies from the 1940 Act, but the definitions of "bank" and "insurance company" in § 2(a)(17),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(17), are limited to U.S. banks and insurance companies. According to the
SEC's interpretation, foreign banks and insurance companies remain within the scope of the 1940
Act.
On October 29, 1991, the Commission adopted rule 3a-6, which excepts certain foreign banks and
insurance companies from the definition of "investment company" in § 3(a)(1) and § 3(a)(3). See
Investment Company Act Release No. 18381, 50 SEC Docket 4 (1991). Rule 3a-6 replaced rule 6c-9,
which generally exempted from registration under the Act foreign banks and their finance subsidiaries
offering debt and nonvoting preferred stock. The Commission had proposed amendments to rule 6c-9
that would have extended the exemptions to all foreign banks and foreign insurance companies, their
holding companies, and their finance subsidiaries, see Release No. 17682, supra note 11, but instead
adopted rule 3a-6. See also Investment Company Act Release No. 17681, 55 Fed. Reg. 34,569
(1990) (interpreting U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks generally to be "banks" under
§ 2(a)(5)(C)); Investment Company Act Release No. 17357, 55 Fed. Reg. 7706 (1990) (adopting rule
12d -I to permit investment companies to invest in foreign banks and insurance companies without
regard to § 12(d)(1)(A)), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1)(A); Investment Company Act Release No.
16093, 52 Fed. Reg. 42,280 (1987) (adopting rule 6c-9).
These regulatory measures followed a series of orders issued by the Commission under § 6(c) of
the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c), to exempt foreign banks and insurance companies from specific
provisions of the Act. See, e.g., FAI Insurance Ltd., Investment Company Act Release No. 17362,
45 SEC Docket 1368 (1990); Bank Bumi Daya New York Agency, 43 SEC Docket 510 (1988);
Westpac Banking Corp., Investment Company Act Release No. 15217, 36 SEC Docket 252 (1986);
Banque Nationale de Paris, Credit Lyonnais Kansallis-Osake-Pankki, Post-Och Kreditbanken, Skan-
dinaviska Erskilda Banken, Socigtg Generale and Svenska Handelbanken, Investment Company Act
Release Nos. 10813-17, 10820-21, 18 SEC Docket 38-41, 18 SEC Docket 48-50 (1979).
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SEC finds that "by reason of special circumstances or arrangements, it is both
legally and practically feasible effectively to enforce" the 1940 Act against the
foreign investment company, and an order permitting a public offering is con-
sistent with the public interest and the protection of investors. 12
The SEC has interpreted section 7(d) effectively to require the agency "to
determine that investors in foreign investment companies have the same protec-
tions as investors in domestic investment companies" before permitting regis-
tration.1 3 According to this interpretation, section 7(d) requires foreign invest-
ment companies that seek to register to comply with all of the provisions of the
1940 Act or a substantially equivalent foreign regulation, although exemptions
from specific provisions of the 1940 Act may be granted under section 6(c).
14
Moreover, section 7(d) requires that it be "practically feasible effectively to
enforce" the 1940 Act. The 1940 Act may not be enforceable if a foreign
investment company and its management company or adviser are headquartered,
conduct their principal business, or maintain their books and records in a foreign
jurisdiction or if they do not have sufficient assets in the United States to attach
in an enforcement action. 
1 5
12. See 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 7(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d).
13. Study Release, supra note 4, at 878.
14. See Investment Company Act Release No. 8959, 40 Fed. Reg. 45,424 (1975). In 1954, the
SEC adopted rule 7d-1, which provides guidance to Canadian investment companies and is relied
upon by other foreign investment companies interested in offering their shares in the United States.
See Investment Company Act Release No. 1973, 19 Fed. Reg. 2585 (1954) (adopting rule 7d-l);
Investment Company Act Release No. 8596, 5 SEC Docket 640 (1974) (discussing reliance on rule
7d-l). Rule 7d-1 generally requires an investment company to agree that it will cause certain
affiliated persons to comply with the 1940 Act and include in its charter and bylaws most of the
substantive provisions of the 1940 Act. See rule 7d-l(b)(1) and (8), supra note 14. The Commission
has issued § 7(d) orders to foreign investment companies that undertake to cause affiliated parties to
comply with the 1940 Act, and to include the "substantive" provisions of the 1940 Act in their
organizational documents. See e.g., Pan Australian Fund Ltd., Investment Company Act Release
No. 8028, 2 SEC Docket 585 (1973); First American-Australian Investors Ltd., Investment
Company Act Release No. 6517 (May 12, 1971) (LEXIS, Fed. Sec library, SEC Rel file);
American-South African Investment Co., Ltd., Investment Company Act Release No. 2756
(Aug. 13, 1958) (LEXIS, Fed Sec library, SEC Rel file); Scudder Fund of Canada, Ltd.,
Investment Company Act Release No. 1975 (Apr. 27, 1954) (LEXIS, Fed Sec library, SEC Rel
file); Resources of Canada Investment Fund, Ltd., Investment Company Act Release No. 1974
(Apr. 27, 1954) (LEXIS, Fed Sec library, SEC Rel file).
15. Rule 7d-I contains numerous provisions that are designed to ensure that the SEC and private
shareholders can enforce the 1940 Act against Canadian investment companies that are granted § 7(d)
orders. For example, the rule requires that the charter and bylaws of the foreign investment company
contain most of the substantive provisions of the 1940 Act. See rule 7d-l(b)(8)(i), supra note 14. The
company must agree that those charter and bylaw provisions and the 1940 Act may be contractually
enforced in the United States or Canada by its shareholders, rule 7d-l(b)(6), and that at least a
majority of its officers and directors will be citizens of the United States and a majority of that
majority will be residents of the United States. See rule 7d-l(b)(8)(iv), supra note 14. The company
must agree to cause each officer, director, investment adviser, principal underwriter, and custodian to
comply with the 1940 Act. See rule 7d-l(b)(1)(i), supra note 12. The rule also generally requires the
Canadian investment company to maintain its assets in the United States, rule 7d-l(b)(8)(5), and
agree to their liquidation and distribution at the direction of the Commission or the courts upon a
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Section 7(d) generally prevents the public offering in the United States of
UCITS, as it does other foreign investment companies. For example, most
UCITS would be unable to represent that they will comply with all of the
substantive provisions of the 1940 Act, that a majority of their officers and
directors will be U.S. citizens, and that they will maintain their assets in the
United States. As discussed below, some existing interpretations of section 7(d)
also could, in this author's opinion, impede the entry of foreign investment
companies.
2. Particular Issues Under Section 7(d)
Several important issues have arisen from the language of section 7(d) and
from the staff's interpretation of that section. For example, the staff has consid-
ered the applicability of section 7(d) to private U.S. offerings, the degree to
which the jurisdictional means must be used to trigger section 7(d), and the
integration principles that must be applied under section 7(d).
a. Private Offerings
The SEC has taken the position that section 7(d) generally prohibits even a
private placement of foreign investment company shares in the United States if
upon completion of the private placement more than 100 persons resident in the
United States are beneficial owners of the company's securities. 1 6 The staff took
this position in response to a no-action request from an adviser to a foreign fund
that intended to privately place its securities in the United States while publicly
offering its securities abroad. 17 The requesting party asked for assurances that
the private placement in the United States would not be deemed a "public
finding of noncompliance by the company or its officers and directors with their agreements or the
Commission's order of registration. See rule 7d-l(b)(5)(ii), supra note 14.
In 1975, the SEC issued a policy and guidelines for the registration of foreign investment com-
panies. See Investment Company Act Release No. 8959, 40 Fed. Reg. 45,424 (1975). The release
recommends that an application for a § 7(d) order describe the conditions to the application that
would ensure that the 1940 Act is enforceable against the applicant. Id. The release indicates that the
applicant may take measures to ensure enforceability that are different from the requirements in rule
7d- 1. Id. For example, in lieu of keeping the investment company's assets in the United States and
ensuring that a majority of its directors are U.S. citizens, the company and its management could post
a bond that would ensure collection of a judgment against them for securities law violations. Id.
The Commission subsequently admitted that it may be difficult for foreign investment companies
to comply with many of the requirements in rule 7d-I and the 1975 release that are designed to ensure
that the 1940 Act is enforceable. See Investment Company Act Release No. 13691, 1983 SEC Docket
834 (1983). For example, the Commission said that:
the business practices and customs of a particular country may make it difficult or impossible for a foreign company
to get its managers to accept personal liability by submitting to United States jurisdiction. The inability to submit
to the jurisdiction of United States courts makes it difficult for the Commission to find under § 7(d) that he Act
would be legally enforceable against the applicant.
Id. Due to these and other problems, the Commission recommended that foreign investment com-
panies establish mirror funds in the United States. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 54-59
(discussing establishment of mirror funds).
16. See Securities Act Release No. 6862, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933, at 17,940-44) (1990); Touche
Remnant & Co., 43 SEC Docket 453 (1984).
17. Id. at 455-61.
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offering" under section 7(d) and that the offerings would not be integrated for
section 7(d) purposes. 1 8
In adopting its Touche Remnant position, the staff reasoned that section 3(c)(1)
of the 1940 Act excepts from the definition of investment company any issuer
whose outstanding securities are beneficially owned by no more than 100 persons
and which is not making a public offering of its securities. 19 According to the
staff, section 3(c)(1) "indicates a regulatory interest under the 1940 Act in an
investment company whose securities are beneficially owned by more than 100
persons." 20 Citing legislative history, the staff stated that section 7(d) was in-
tended to ensure that foreign investment companies whose conduct has a signif-
icant effect on U.S. investors are subject to the "same type of regulation that
applies to American investment companies." 21 Since domestic investment com-
panies with more than 100 beneficial owners (and which are not otherwise
exempt from the 1940 Act) must register, then similar foreign investment com-
panies also should be required to register, according to the staff.
22
In its release adopting rule 144A, the Commission appears to have adopted the
23staff's Touche Remnant position. After reciting the staff's position in Touche
Remnant, the Commission stated:
The Commission believes that resales of privately placed investment company securi-
ties pursuant to the safe harbor provisions of Rule 144A would not . . . cause a
violation of section 7(d) of the Investment Company Act as long as after the resale the
securities are held . . . by no more than 100 beneficial owners who are U.S. resi-
dents. 24
The Commission further stated that rule 144A would not obviate the need for a
foreign investment company to apply for an exemptive order allowing it to
register if there would be more than 100 U.S. residents who are beneficial
owners of its securities.
25
18. Id. at 460.
19. Id. at 453.
20. Id. (footnote omitted).
21. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1940); H.R. RE. No. 2639, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1940)).
22. Id. at 453-54.
23. See Release No. 6862, supra note 16.
24. Id. at 17940-41.
25. Id. The Touche Remnant position effectively prevents foreign funds from offering their
securities in the United States if they would have more than 100 U.S. beneficial security holders.
Moreover, a foreign fund that intends to privately place its securities in the United States normally
must have procedures to ensure that its U.S. ownership will not exceed that level. Cf. Shearson Int'l
Dollar Reserves, infra note 35; Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., infra note 36; Huntington World Investors
Funds Ltd., infra note 37 (procedural representations with respect to offshore funds that intend to
limit or avoid U.S. ownership). These procedures generally require that the fund make arrangements
with its dealers to monitor the nationality of the beneficial owners, that the limitations on its U.S.
ownership be described in its offering documents, and, if possible, that its securities be in registered
form. See Shearson Int'l Dollar Reserves, infra note 35; Merrill Lynch & Co, Inc., infra note 37;
Huntington World Investors Funds Ltd., infra note 37. In the author's opinion, these procedures may
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In its no-action request, Touche Remnant stated that it was not relying on
section 3(c)(1). 26 The firm did not deny that the investment fund that it intended
to offer in the United States could be deemed to be an investment company under
the 1940 Act. 27 Touche Remnant merely sought assurances that the staff would
not recommend enforcement action for violations of section 7(d) if the invest-
ment fund privately placed its securities in the United States while publicly
offering its securities overseas.
The limitations of section 3(c)(1) do not appear in section 7(d). Section 7(d)
generally prohibits the offer and sale of foreign investment company shares in
connection with a "public offering," and authorizes the SEC to permit the
company to register and to make "a public offering" of its securities. 28 The
section does not prohibit private placement of foreign investment company
shares, regardless of the number of U.S. beneficial owners that the investment
company would have after the private placement was completed.
This author maintains that a foreign investment company does not violate
section 7(d) merely by privately placing its securities in the United States,
regardless of the number of its U.S. beneficial owners. 29 Of course, this inter-
pretation could lead to disparate treatment of foreign and domestic investment
companies. As discussed above, a U.S. investment fund is generally exempt
from the definition of investment company if its shares are not beneficially
owned by more than 100 persons and if it is not and does not propose to publicly
offer its securities. A U.S. investment fund with more than 100 shareholders
would be required to register under section 7(a) before offering its securities,
even in a private placement (assuming that it does not qualify for another ex-
emption). Under the author's interpretation, a foreign investment fund with more
than 100 beneficial owners would not fall within the 1940 Act merely because it
makes a private placement in the United States. This disparate treatment is
dictated by the statute itself, which generally applies to U.S. investment com-
panies unless they are exempt, but generally does not apply to foreign investment
companies unless they attempt to publicly offer their securities through the
jurisdictional means. 30 The staff's concern in Touche Remnant that foreign funds
be impractical with respect to some funds, particularly if they have an extensive distribution network
and a long marketing history abroad, and if their securities are in bearer form. These funds might be
unable to comply with Touche Remnant because they cannot be certain that they will have fewer than
100 U.S. beneficial owners.
26. Touche Remnant & Co., 43 SEC Docket 453, 458 (1984).
27. Id. at 455-61.
28. 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 7(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d).
29. As discussed below, a private placement may violate § 7(d) if it is conducted simultaneously
with an overseas public offering that comes to rest in the United States. See text accompanying infra
notes 33-45.
30. The staff rejected this interpretation in part because of the disparate treatment that it would
require. Touche Remnant, 43 SEC Docket at 454. The staff relied upon legislative history for its
conclusion that Congress did not intend such inconsistent treatment. Id. at 453 n.2. The legislative
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be subject to the same regulation as domestic funds is ironic since the SEC had
already recognized that section 7(d) effectively prevents foreign funds from
entering the public U.S. markets. The Touche Remnant letter was issued barely
six months after the Commission submitted to Congress legislation to amend
section 7(d). 3' In its memorandum in support of the legislation, the Commission
observed:
Section 7(d) . tends to operate in a way that prevents foreign investment companies
from registering under the Act and offering their shares in the United States. The
consequences too often are needless costs and insurmountable barriers to foreign com-
panies seeking access to United States markets, lost competitive opportunities, and a
denial of investment opportunities for United States investors.
32
The Touche Remnant interpretation needlessly exacerbates these consequences.
b. Offshore Offerings
The Commission staff has frequently addressed the question of whether sec-
tion 7(d) applies to offshore offerings of investment company securities. The
staff has taken the position that the Commission has jurisdiction over any public
offering of investment company shares that uses the jurisdictional means. 3 The
staff apparently reasons that because section 7(d) applies to a foreign fund that
intends to "offer for sale, sell, or deliver after sale, in connection with a public
offering," whether or not in the United States, section 7(d) prohibits offshore as
well as domestic offerings that use the jurisdictional means.
In most earlier cases the staff took this position regardless of the effects that
the offering would have on U.S. investors or on the U.S. markets. Nevertheless,
the staff generally did not recommend that the Commission exercise jurisdiction
if the jurisdictional contacts were minimal. 34 For example, the fact that non-U. S.
offerees had assets or accounts in the United States that are to be used to acquire
shares or receive the proceeds of a sale or redemption, or that the shares are to
history cited by the staff states that under § 7(d) foreign investment companies may not "publicly
offer [their] securities" unless the Commission finds that they "can be effectively subjected to the
same type of regulation as domestic investment companies." S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
13 (1940); H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1940). This passage expresses the
Congressional intent that foreign investment companies that publicly offer their shares in the U.S. be
subject to the same type of regulation as domestic investment companies. It does not express an
intention that foreign investment companies that privately place their securities in the U.S. be subject
to the same type of regulation.
31. See Letter from John S. R. Shad, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, to the
Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker, United States House of Representatives (Jan. 31, 1984)
(copy available from the author).
32. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of the Foreign In-
vestment Company Amendments Act of 1984, at I (copy available from the author).
33. See, e.g., The American Certificates of Deposit Fund, Ref. No. 591CC (June 4, 1975)
(LEXIS, Fed Sec library, No-Act file) ("It is important to note that section 7(d) does not require the
public offering to be in the United States if the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce are
used in the public offering.").
34. Id.
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be held in the name of a U.S. broker, did not constitute a sufficient basis for the
staff to recommend enforcement action. 35 The use of the jurisdictional means to
deliver prospectuses, maintain fund assets at a U.S. bank, receive and effect
purchase and redemption orders for fund shares, and prepare and send confir-
mations also did not constitute a sufficient basis for an enforcement recommen-
dation.
3 6
Most of these staff no-action positions were based on requesters' representa-
tions that they would offer the fund shares only to non-U.S. persons outside of
the United States and that they would take specific measures to ensure that only
non-U.S. purchasers acquired the shares.3 7 The staff's reliance on these repre-
sentations implies recognition that the Commission's territorial approach to reg-
istration under the Securities Act also is appropriate under section 7(d) of the
1940 Act.
The registration provisions of the Securities Act apply to any offer or sale
involving interstate commerce, without limitation to U.S. offerings.3 8 The Com-
mission has stated that it would not take any enforcement action for failure to
register securities of U.S. corporations distributed abroad solely to foreign na-
tionals, even though the jurisdictional means were used, if the distribution was
effected in a manner that would result in the securities coming to rest abroad.3 9
Most of the section 7(d) requesters argued that the Commission's territorial
approach in Release No. 4708 should apply to section 7(d), and the staff appar-
ently agreed. 4°
35. See Shearson Int'l Dollar Reserves, 43 SEC Docket 414 (1981).
36. See Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 43 SEC Docket 481 (1986).
37. See Shearson; Merrill Lynch; see also Huntington World Investors Funds Ltd. (Sept. 18,
1989) (LEXIS, Fed Sec library, No-Act file) (representations concerning offshore fund).
38. Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1990).
39. Securities Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964). Although Release No. 4708
refers only to domestic issuers, the staff also has applied the release to foreign issuers. See, e.g.,
Vizcaya Int'l N.V. (Apr. 4, 1973) (LEXIS, Fed Sec library, No-Act file); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 41-43 (discussing Regulation S).
40. A related question is whether a foreign investment company that simultaneously offers its
securities in the United States and conducts a public offering abroad must integrate the two offerings
in order to determine whether the U.S. offering is a private placement exempt from § 7(d). The staff
generally takes a territorial approach to the integration issue, as it does to the application of § 7(d)
to offshore offerings. The requester in Touche Remnant had asked whether its private placement in
the United States would be integrated with a foreign public offering. See Touch Remnant & Co., 43
SEC Docket 453, 459-60 (1984). As discussed above, the staff opined that a private placement in
the United States would be subject to § 7(d) if upon its completion the foreign investment company
would have more than 100 U.S. beneficial owners. Since Touche Remnant, the staff generally has
taken the position that if a private offering complies with Touche Remnant, then it would not be
integrated with an offshore public offering that will come to rest abroad, even if the offshore offering
makes limited use of the jurisdictional means in the United States. See e.g., G.T. Global Financial
Services, Inc., 43 SEC Docket 534 (1988).
Although the requester in Touche Remnant asked about integration, the staff's response established
a standard for the determination of when § 7(d) would apply to U.S. offerings, whether or not there
was a simultaneous foreign offering. As the staff said, the 100 beneficial owner test was necessary:
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A more recent analogy might be the Commission's Regulation S, which clar-
ifies the territorial scope of the registration provisions of the Securities Act.
41
Regulation S generally provides that any offer or sale that occurs in the United
States is subject to section 5 of the Securities Act, and any offer or sale outside
the United States is not subject to section 5.4 The regulation provides two safe
harbors for specified transactions. 43 Offers and sales meeting all the conditions
of the applicable safe harbor are deemed to be outside the United States and not
subject to section 5.44 The scope of Regulation S includes the offer and sale of
shares in unregistered investment companies.
45
c. Section 6(c) Exemptive Orders
Although the SEC has long considered rule 7d-1 to be a guide for section 7(d)
applications by non-Canadian as well as Canadian investment companies,46 and
has never granted a section 7(d) application that did not comply with rule 7d-1,
the Commission has indicated that it might permit the registration of foreign
investment companies under different standards. In its 1975 policy and guide-
lines for registration by foreign investment companies the Commission stated
that "compliance with the conditions and arrangements in Rule 7d-1 need not
necessarily be the only means of satisfying the statutory standards of [section
7(d)]." 4 7 For example, said the Commission, in lieu of the requirement in rule
7d-1 that a company maintain its assets in the United States and that a majority
of its directors and officers be U.S. citizens, a company and its management
"not because the foreign investment company is offering its shares both in the U.S. and abroad.
America's jurisdictional interest in a company is based on its specific activities in the U.S. or the
effects in the U.S. of its activities conducted abroad." Touche Remnant & Co., 43 SEC Docket at
453. The staff's analysis of when an offering will come to rest abroad also seems to be the same
whether or not there is a simultaneous private placement in the United States. Compare, e.g., G.T.
Global Financial Services, Inc., 43 SEC Docket at 534, and Merrill Lynch, 43 SEC Docket at 481.
41. See Securities Act Release No. 6863, 55 Fed. Reg. 18306 (1990) (adopting Regulation S).
42. Id. at 18,306.
43. Id. One safe harbor (the so-called "issuer safe harbor") generally applies to offers and sales
by issuers, securities professionals involved in the distribution process pursuant to contract, their
respective affiliates, and persons acting on behalf of any of the foregoing. Id. at 18307. The other
safe harbor (the so-called "resale safe harbor") generally applies to resales by persons other than
issuers, professionals in distribution, affiliates (except certain officers and directors), or those acting
on their behalf. Id.
44. Id. at 18,306.
45. Release No. 6863, supra note 41, at 18,320. Regulation S also is available for the offer and
sale of shares in registered closed-end funds. Id. at 18321. The Commission requested comment on
whether to extend the regulation to offers and sales of securities issued by registered mutual funds and
unit investment trusts. Id.
The staff has not opined on whether a private placement that meets the requirements of Touche
Remnant must be integrated with a simultaneous foreign offering that complies with Regulation S.
The adopting release for Regulation S states that "[o]ffering activities in contemporaneous registered
offerings or offerings exempt from registration will not preclude reliance on the [Regulation S] safe
harbors." Release No. 6863, supra note 41, at 18,311 n.47.
46. See, e.g., Investment Company Act Release No. 8596, 1974 SEC Docket 640, 642 (1974).
47. Investment Company Act Release No. 8959, 1975 SEC Docket 1002, 1003 (1975).
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might obtain a bond to assure collection on any judgment against them rendered
by a U.S. court for a securities law violation.
48
The Commission also stated that it has authority under sections 6(c) and 6(e)
of the 1940 Act to exempt conditionally an applicant from any provision of the
Act. 49 The Commission added that for investment companies that cannot comply
with rule 7d-1, "relief, pursuant to the terms of section 7(d), section 6(c), or
pursuant to the terms of other applicable sections of the Act, may be appropri-
ate." 50 This assertion by the Commission could be broadly interpreted to mean
that the Commission would permit registration under section 6(c) even when the
standards for a section 7(d) order are not met.5 t In the author's opinion, section
6(c) may not be so construed since it would render section 7(d) as surplusage.
Indeed, elsewhere the release states that "the Commission remains bound by the
standards of section 7(d) of the Act in determining whether an order permitting
registration should be issued. ' 5 2 This statement implies that section 7(d) gener-
ally would govern the registration question, but that the SEC might grant section
6(c) relief from particular provisions of the 1940 Act. The Commission has
issued orders that permit registration under section 7(d) and also grant section
6(c) relief from particular provisions of the 1940 Act.5 3
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1003-04.
50. Id. at 1004.
51. Section 6(c) authorizes the Commission to issue exemptive orders from "any provision or
provisions of [the 1940 Act] or any rule or regulation thereunder, if and to the extent that such
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of
investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of [the Act]." 1940 Act, supra
note 2, § 6(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(c).
52. Release No. 8959, supra note 15, at 1003.
53. See, e.g., Scudder Fund of Canada, Ltd., Investment Company Act Release No. 1946
(Jan. 28, 1954) (LEXIS, Fed Sec library, SEC Rel file) (issuance of § 7(d) order with § 6(c)
exemption from § 22(e)(1) and § 32(a)).
This strict adherence to the standards in section 7(d) may appear inconsistent with some § 6(c)
orders, in which the Commission has permitted foreign banks, insurance companies, and finance
authorities of foreign governments to offer their shares in the United States without registering under
the 1940 Act. See supra notes 49-52. See also Western Australian Treasury Corp., Investment
Company Act Release No. 17673, 46 SEC Docket 1765 (1990); Victorian Public Authorities Finance
Agency, Investment Company Act Release No. 16429, 41 SEC Docket 160 (1988); The Queensland
Government Development Authority, Investment Company Act Release No. 15177, 36 SEC Docket
44 (1986). In these orders, the Commission did not apply the standards in § 7(d) to determine whether
the companies could register, let alone offer their shares.
In the author's opinion, these orders manifest the Commission's conclusion that although the 1940
Act technically applies to these entities, because they do not operate as investment companies and
they are regulated as banks, insurance companies, or finance authorities, these entities should be
excluded from the 1940 Act as their domestic counterparts are. As discussed above, on October 29,
1991, the Commission adopted rule 3a-6, which excepts certain foreign banks and insurance com-
panies from the definition of "investment company" in § 3(a)(1) and § 3(a)(3). See Release No.
18381, supra note 11. The rule limits the definition of "foreign bank" and "foreign insurance
company" to banking institutions and insurance companies "[riegulated as such by [its] country's or
subdivision's government or any agency thereof .. " See rule 3a-6(a)(1)(i)(A); rule 3a-6(a)(3)(i),
Release No. 18381, supra note 11. In its release adopting the rule, the Commission stated: "The rule
...would adopt the general approaches that the Act takes with regard to United States banks and
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3. "Mirror" Funds
The Commission has encouraged foreign investment companies to establish
"mirror" funds in the United States as an alternative to a section 7(d) applica-
tion.54 These funds invest in a portfolio of securities that is similar to the
portfolio of the foreign funds. 55 Thus, fund sponsors are able to offer U.S.
investors an investment like the foreign fund, without having to restructure the
foreign fund or fundamentally modify its operations so that it complies with the
1940 Act.
5 6
In some cases the establishment of a mirror fund is practically impossible
because the sponsor does not have a distribution network in the United States.
Moreover, foreign funds that establish and offer mirror funds in the United States
incur many of the costs that are incurred by any foreign fund that is allowed to
offer its shares in the United States. These costs may include distribution and
marketing expenses, the cost of establishing an office in the United States, and
the costs of complying with the 1940 Act.57 Mirror funds also may sacrifice
insurance companies. The Commission favors this approach because foreign banks and insurance
companies do not operate as investment companies." Investment Company Act Release No. 18381,
50 SEC Docket 4 (1991) (footnote omitted). In the author's opinion, the Commission has not and
probably will not defy the restraints of § 7(d) and grant broad § 6(c) relief to other types of investment
companies that operate as such and that fail to meet the § 7(d) standards.
54. See Release No. 13691, supra note 18. The decision to encourage use of foreign funds
followed the unhappy Unifonds experience. Id. In 1982, the Commission issued a notice of an
application filed on behalf of Unifonds, a West German mutual fund, for a § 7(d) order and for a
§ 6(c) order exempting the fund from several provisions of the 1940 Act. See Union-Investment-
Gesellschaft m.b.H., Investment Company Act Release No. 12863, 26 SEC Docket 1333 (1982).
This notice was issued twelve years after the application had been filed. Id. After issuance of the
notice the Investment Company Institute requested a hearing, arguing that the applicant had failed to
meet the standard of enforceability under § 7(d) and had failed to meet the standard in § 6(c) for
specific exemptive relief. See Union-Investment-Gesellschaft m.b.H, Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 13234, 27 SEC Docket 1592 (1983). The Commission ordered a hearing, at which point
the applicant withdrew its application. Id.
In its release encouraging the use of mirror funds, the Commission noted that the Unifonds
application had demonstrated that there may be practical difficulties in obtaining § 7(d) orders,
particularly if extensive § 6(c) relief is also sought. See Release No. 13691, supra note 15, at
834-35. Some foreign investment advisers have chosen to establish mirror funds rather than apply
for § 7(d) relief. See, e.g., Mexico Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act Registration No. 811-3170
(cited in Release No. 13691, supra note 15, at 835 n.6); Nomura Index Fund of Japan, Inc.,
Investment Company Act Registration No. 811-2813 (cited in Release No. 13691 at 835 n.6).
55. See generally Release No. 13691, supra note 15.
56. By establishing a mirror fund, a foreign fund (but not the mirror fund) also can avoid the
distribution and PFIC requirements of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, which are discussed infra at
text accompanying note 225.
57. The Commission has implicitly recognized that investment companies need significant cap-
italization to bear the costs of doing business. As discussed above, the Commission's 1984 legislative
proposal would have applied only to foreign investment companies with, among other things, at least
$100 million in net assets. See Letter from John S.R. Shad, supra note 31. The Commission's
memorandum in support of the legislation stated that the bill would permit "responsible" foreign
investment companies to have better access to the U.S. markets. See Memorandum of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, supra note 32, at 4. In 1975, the Commission stated that an applicant
for a § 7(d) order should have a minimum of $50 million in net assets at the time of registration
and $25 million at the time of its U.S. securities offering. Investment Company Act Release No.
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certain benefits that foreign funds enjoy when they are permitted to offer their
shares directly in the United States. These benefits may include the economies of
scale derived from offering an existing fund in the United States and the ability
to advertise the investment record of an existing fund.58 Yet, as discussed below,
mirror funds will continue to serve as the principal vehicle for the offer of foreign
funds in the United States.
5 9
4. Legislation to Amend Section 7(d)
As discussed above, in 1984 the Commission submitted to Congress proposed
legislation that would have amended section 7(d) to facilitate the offer and sale
of foreign investment company shares in the United States. The legislation would
have retained the general prohibition on the public offering of foreign investment
company shares in the United States, and the language authorizing the Commis-
sion to register a foreign investment company if it finds, among other things, that
it is "legally and practically feasible effectively to enforce" the 1940 Act against
the company. The bill would have authorized the SEC to grant an exemption to
any operating foreign investment company from any provision of the 1940 Act
if: (1) compliance would be unduly burdensome because the company is orga-
8959, supra note 47, at 640. The purpose of this requirement apparently was to ensure that the
company was "a bona fide and established company." Id.
58. It is possible that the SEC would deem the advertisement by a mirror fund of the performance
of the UCITS to violate the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act. See Advisers Act § 206(4), 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6(4); rule 206(4)-1(a)(2); rule 206(4)-(a)(5). The staff apparently has never been
asked to take a no-action position with respect to the ability of a mirror fund to advertise the foreign
fund's performance. Advertisement of performance data might be particularly misleading if there is
a substantial difference between the operations or the computation and deduction of fees and ex-
penses of the UCITS and the mirror fund, which are not adequately disclosed in the advertisement.
Cf. Clover Capital Mgmt., Inc. (Oct. 28, 1986), 1986 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2883 (advertisement of
actual or model performance results without deduction for expenses prohibited under rule 206(4)-
I(a)(5)). Cf. also Investment Company Institute, 1987 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2361 (Aug. 24, 1987)
(closed-end funds complying with Growth Stock Outlook Trust deduct actual fees and expenses
associated with private accounts). As discussed below, there are significant differences in the reg-
ulation of UCITS under the Directive and the regulation of mutual funds under the 1940 Act. These
differences may be reflected in the operations and structure of UCITS and mirror funds.
The staff has given no-action assurances to a newly formed closed-end fund that intended to
advertise for one year the performance of its adviser's other accounts. See Growth Stock Outlook
Trust, Inc., 1986 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2026 (Apr. 15, 1986). The advertisements were limited to
accounts with substantially similar objectives, policies, and strategies to those of the fund. Id. The
advertisements also were limited to accounts with a similar size to the fund. Id. Finally, the
advertisements had to make clear that the performance information related to the adviser's
management of private accounts and that it should not be interpreted to indicate the fund's future
performance. Id.
59. In 1973, the SEC submitted to Congress the Foreign Portfolio Sales Corporation Act of
1973. See Release No. 8596, supra note 46, at 642 (discussion of SEC's proposal). The Commis-
sion's proposal would have amended § 7(d) to authorize the Commission, in considering § 7(d)
applications, to "take into account the differing laws, regulations, customs and business conditions
of particular countries and the adequacy of existing regulations in such countries." Foreign Portfolio
Sales Corporation Act of 1973, quoted in Release No. 8596, supra note 46, at 642. The Commis-
sion's legislation was introduced in 1973 by Congressman Harley 0. Staggers as H.R. 8256, but was
never enacted. Id. at 645 n.7.
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nized under foreign law and invests primarily in foreign securities; (2) the law
under which the company operates provides investor protections that serve the
same purposes as the exempted provisions or that special conditions agreed to by
the company provide such protections; (3) the exemption is consistent with the
protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy of the Act;
and (4) the company is not operated to evade the Act. 60 The SEC's 1984 pro-
posal was never introduced in Congress.
In 1990 the Commission issued its Study Release, in which it solicited com-
ments on reform of the regulation of investment companies under the 1940 Act,
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.61 In its Study Release the Commission requested comment
on the effect of the Investment Company Act on international competition. 62
Several commenters wrote in favor of amending section 7(d).63 Most qualified
their support with a suggestion that adequate investor protections be maintained.64
Some commenters also recommended that liberalization of section 7(d) be con-
ditioned on providing U.S. investment companies access to foreign markets. The
commenters suggested that a unilateral liberalization of U.S. regulation would
provide an "unjustified one-way street," by permitting more foreign investment
companies to compete in the U.S. market without ensuring that U.S. investment
companies have access to foreign markets. 65 Instead, these commenters suggested
that access to the United States markets would be improved only if foreign ju-
risdictions offer reciprocal assurances that access to their markets will be similarly
improved.66 They recommended negotiations with foreign jurisdictions, such as
the European Community, to effect such reciprocal treatment.
67
60. The legislation would have defined "operating foreign investment company" as a foreign
company that had during the prior three years a minimum of 500 non-U.S. shareholders and $100
million in net assets, and which was primarily engaged in investing in non-U.S. securities. Letter
from John Shad, supra note 31.
The legislation would have authorized the Commission to revoke its order if it found that (1) it is
not legally and practically feasible effectively to enforce the provisions of the Act to which the
company is subject, (2) an exempted company is not primarily engaged in investing in non-U.S.
securities, or (3) the laws under which the company operates do not provide investor protections
which have the same purposes as the exempted provisions or specific conditions agreed to by the
company do not provide those protections. Id.
61. See supra note 4.
62. Study Release, supra note 4, at 879.
63. See, e.g., Letter to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, from
Frank W. Giordano, Executive Vice President, Prudential Mutual Fund Management 7-8 (October 9,
1990); Comments of the Investment Company Institute, supra note 9, at 64-68.
64. See, e.g., Letter to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 63, at 8; Comments of the Investment
Company Institute, supra note 9, at 65-66.
65. See, e.g., Letter to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 63, at 8; Comments of the Investment
Company Institute, supra note 9, at 65-66.
66. See, e.g., Letter to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 63, at 8; Comments of the Investment
Company Institute, supra note 9, at 65-66.
67. See, e.g., Comments of the Investment Company Institute, supra note 9, at 65-66. As
discussed below, since 1987 the Investment Company Institute and the EC mutual fund industry have
discussed a possible agreement for reciprocal treatment in their markets, modeled on the UCITS
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This reciprocal approach to reform advocated by commentators would be
misguided, and would represent a step backward. Section 7(d) generally pro-
vides, in trade policy terms, national treatment of foreign funds in the United
States. Foreign funds are subject to the same requirements in the 1940 Act as
domestic funds. 68 A reciprocal approach would envision the application of more
onerous restrictions on foreign funds, an approach that would be inconsistent
with the national treatment policy of the United States Government. 69 A recip-
rocal approach would foster a trade war in financial services, limit the opportu-
nities of U.S. investors to invest overseas, and imperil the cost reductions that
foreign competition might engender.
In addition, negotiations for reciprocal treatment by the European Community
would be particularly difficult. As discussed below, the UCITS Directive rep-
resents the Community's exercise of authority in a limited field for specific
funds. Each Member State may legislate the fields not covered by the Directive
and may adopt its own regulations for funds that are not covered by the Direc-
tive. Moreover, the Member States administer the Directive. In order to reach an
agreement to remove the impediments to entry in the European Community, the
United States must negotiate with the Community on matters covered by the
Directive. The United States must also negotiate with the Member States on
other matters, such as marketing,7° tax issues, or issues involving types of
funds not covered by the Directive. The United States also might have to
negotiate with individual Member States in order to resolve any issues arising
from their implementation of the Directive. 71 The dispersed regulatory authority
Directive. See infra note 95. Legislation also has been introduced to authorize the Commission, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to deny registration as an investment adviser (or
acquisition of a registered investment adviser) to a person from a foreign country that, according to
the Treasury Department, discriminates against American investment advisers. See S. 347, Title IV,
the Fair Trade in Financial Services Act of 1990, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (passed Senate, February 2,
1991).
68. Indeed, the 1940 Act arguably provides "national treatment plus," treatment that makes
special allowance for foreign funds that cannot be made for domestic ones. The Commission can,
under § 6(c), exempt a foreign fund from a provision of the 1940 Act if the fund or the laws to which
the fund is subject would provide comparable investor protections. See infra text accompanying notes
46-53 (discussing Commission's § 6(c) authority).
69. See, e.g., International Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 611 (national treatment of banks); Financial
Reports Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C. § § 5351-5354 (requiring a study of the national treatment of U.S.
financial firms).
70. The Investment Company Institute, which has been engaged in discussions with the EC mutual
fund industry on an agreement for reciprocal treatment, acknowledges that the agreement probably
would leave local marketing rules in place. See Statement of Matthew P. Fink, infra note 95, at 15.
71. It is possible that negotiations on a state-by-state basis might be more productive than
negotiations with the EC as a whole. As discussed below, the SEC might find certain of the minimum
standards in the Directive to be inadequate for registration of UCITS in the United States. Each
Member State may adopt more stringent regulations in the same field as the Directive with respect
to its own funds. See infra text accompanying note 85. It is possible that the regulations of a Member
State could satisfy the SEC's concerns on a particular issue arising from an application by a UCITS
from that state. Nevertheless, the EC probably would take the position that a Member State may not
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in the Community would make comprehensive negotiation cumbersome, if not
impossible. 2
5. Section 7(d) and UCITS
If a UCITS intends to publicly offer its shares in the United States or to
privately place them when they would be held by more than 100 U.S. beneficial
owners, then it must apply to register under section 7(d). In order to succeed the
UCITS would have to comply with rule 7d- 1. In many cases it would have some
difficulty complying with all of the provisions of that rule.73
As discussed above, the Commission has relied upon its broad authority in
section 6(c) to exempt foreign investment companies from specific provision of
the 1940 Act.74 The Commission's 1984 legislative proposal would not have
amended the general prohibition on registration of foreign investment companies
in section 7(d), or the language in section 7(d) authorizing the Commission to
grant registration if it makes certain findings. Instead, the legislation would have
authorized the Commission to grant exemptions from specific provisions of the
1940 Act if it makes certain findings. The third finding in the legislation, that the
exemption be consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly
intended by the policy of the 1940 Act, is similar to the standard in section
6(c). 7 The three other standards included in the legislation are not in section
6(c). In the author's opinion, the Commission's 1984 proposal would not aug-
ment, and might diminish, the Commission's current authority to grant section
6(c) exemptions to foreign investment companies that register under section
alter (except to augment) any requirement of the Directive, and this stance would hamper negotia-
tions on a state-by-state basis.
72. Although repeal of § 7(d) would be in the public interest, it may be politically unfeasible.
As the Investment Company Institute has noted, even the Commission's milder 1984 legislation
failed to attract a single sponsor in Congress. See Comments of the Investment Company Institute,
supra note 9, at 65-66. Moreover, the ICI could be expected to oppose virtually any legislation to
liberalize § 7(d) that does not provide for reciprocal treatment of foreign funds. See generally
Statement of Matthew P. Fink, infra note 95 (discussing ICI's support of reciprocal treatment). See
also supra note 54 (discussing ICI's opposition to § 7(d) application of Union-Investment-
Gesellschaft m.b.H.).
73. The Commission has found that it is especially difficult for funds that have been organized
in civil law countries to accommodate their operations to regulation under the 1940 Act. For
example, in its Study Release, the Commission stated that: [a]lthough the Commission has granted
exemptions for funds organized in certain common law countries ... section 7(d) continues to
present difficulties for foreign investment companies, especially those organized in civil law
countries." Study Release supra note 2, at 878. The Commission apparently believes that the
similarities between the common law of other countries and U.S. law make funds organized in those
countries more suitable for the U.S. markets. To the author's knowledge, the Commission has never
publicly elucidated those similarities, or explained why it is difficult to accommodate funds
organized in civil law countries. Nevertheless, the perceived difficulties apparently would arise with
respect to any UCITS that has been organized in a Member State other than Ireland, the United
Kingdom, or its territories.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
75. 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 6(c).
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7(d). 76 In order to understand what exemptions would be necessary under either
current law or the Commission's 1984 proposal, and which the Commission
reasonably could provide, one must compare the 1940 Act and the UCITS
Directive.
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UCITS DRECInVE AND THE 1940 ACT
1. General Description of the UCITS Directive
a. Definition of UCITS
The UCITS Directive generally defines UCITS as undertakings (1) the sole
object of which is the collective investment in transferable securities of capital
raised from the public, (2) which operate on the principle of risk-spreading, and
(3) the units of which are at the holders' request repurchased or redeemed out of
those undertakings' assets. 7 UCITS may be constituted under contract law (as
common funds managed by management companies), trust law (as unit trusts),
or statute (as investment companies). 78 UCITS thus are similar to open-end funds
in the United States. The Directive does not apply to UCITS that raise capital
without promoting the sale of their units to the public within the European
Community or that, under the fund rules or the investment company's instru-
ments of incorporation, may sell their units only to the public in non-member
countries.
7 9
76. Section 6(c) also requires that the Commission find that the exemption "is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest." Id. The Commission's 1984 legislative proposal would not have
included such a requirement. Even with this omission, the legislation, taken as a whole, would seem
to impose a stricter test than § 6(c).
77. UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § I, art. 1, $ 2.
The Directive's concept of repurchase or redemption includes any action taken by a UCITS to
ensure that the stock exchange value of its units does not significantly vary from their net asset value.
Id.
78. Id. 3. Both common funds and unit trusts will be referred to as "unit trusts" in this article.
The UCITS Directive treats them identically. Id. Both the common fund and the unit trust UCITS are
managed by a management company. An investment company UCITS, which is an incorporated
entity with a board of directors, is self-managed.
79. Id. § 1, art. 2, 1. Member States also may exclude categories of UCITS situated in those
states if the provisions of the Directive concerning investment policies and borrowings are inappro-
priate for those UCITS. Id.
A principle of the Directive is "once a UCITS, always a UCITS." The Directive requires
Member States to prohibit UCITS that are subject to the Directive from transforming themselves
into collective investment undertakings that are not covered by the Directive. § I, art. 1, 5.
Several Member States insisted that UCITS comply with all of the provisions of the Directive as a
condition to the marketing of UCITS from other Member States in their territory. See Van Damme,
Toward a European Market for the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable
Securities 15 (pub., Commission of the European Communities) (undated) (copy available from
the author). Some Member States found unacceptable the notion that a UCITS from another
Member State could agree to comply with the Directive, enter its markets, and then convert into
another type of investment vehicle. Id. These states were especially concerned about UCITS that
might become vehicles that no longer exclusively invest in transferable securities. Id. Such UCITS
could no longer market their units in another Member State under the Directive, but some Member
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b. Authorization of UCITS
An investment company UCITS or the management company of a unit trust
UCITS must have both its registered and head offices in the same Member State,
and the UCITS must be authorized by the competent authorities of that state.80
That authorization must be recognized by all Member States.
The Directive permits authorization of a UCITS only if the competent author-
ities have approved the depositary, the fund rules, and the management company
(in the case of a unit trust), and the depositary and instruments of incorporation
(in the case of an investment company). 81 The Directive prohibits authorization
if the directors of the management company, the investment company, or the
depositary "are not of sufficiently good repute or lack the experience required for
the performance of their duties." 82 The competent authorities must approve the
replacement of the management company or the depositary and amendment of
the fund rules or the articles of incorporation. 8
3
c. Regulation of UCITS by Member States
A Member State generally may not apply any other rule in the field covered by
the Directive to UCITS situated in another Member State. 84 A Member State
generally may impose stricter requirements on UCITS situated in its territory,
provided that those requirements are not discriminatory85 and do not conflict with
the Directive.
A UCITS that markets its units in another Member State must comply with the
laws in that state that do not fall within the field governed by the Directive,
provided that those laws are applied without discrimination.8 6 The Directive
States found objectionable even the possibility that the units of those UITS could remain in
circulation in their territory. Id.
Like the other provisions of the Directive, this principle applies whether or not a UCIHS markets
its units in other Member States. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § I, art. 1, 5. See also supra
note 77 (discussing general applicability of Directive to UCITS, whether or not they market in other
Member States).
80. Id. § 1, art. 3; Id. § II, art. 4, 1.
The Directive requires the Member States to designate the competent authorities. Id. § IX, art. 49,
1. The competent authorities must be public authorities or bodies appointed by public authorities.
id. § IX, art. 49, 2.
81. Id. § II, art. 4, 2.
82. Id. at section II, Article 4, 3. The term "directors" includes more than those who merely
hold the title. It also includes any person who "represent[s]" the company or "who effectively
determine[s] the policy" of the company. Id.
83. Id. § II, art. 4, 4.
84. Id. § I, art. 1, $ 6. A UCITS is deemed to be situated in the Member State in which the in-
vestment company or the management company of the unit trust has its registered office. Id. § I, art. 3.
85. Id. § I, art. 1, 7. This principle of nondiscrimination may not have been a necessary
provision of the Directive, since it is enshrined in the Treaty of Rome, which established the
European Economic Community. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, art. 7, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
86. UCITS Directive, supra note 3, at § VIII, art. 44, $ 1, 3. If those laws are discriminatorily
applied, then the Directive could be enforced administratively in the European Commission or, if
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requires UCITS to comply with the advertising rules of other Member States in
which it markets its units.
87
A UCITS that proposes to market its units in another Member State must
inform the authorities in that state and send them certain information.8 8 A UCITS
may begin to market its units in the other Member State two months after it sends
the requisite information unless the competent authorities in that state determine
that the UCITS would not comply with the laws of the state falling outside of the
field covered by the Directive, or that the UCITS would not provide the facilities
for disclosure and redemption of units that the Directive requires.89
2. Comparison of the UCITS Directive to the 1940 Act
The regulatory philosophies of the 1940 Act and the UCITS Directive differ in
two important respects. The first, most obvious difference is that the 1940 Act
(along with the Investment Advisers Act and the rules of the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers, Inc.) imposes a single regulatory system primarily
administered by the SEC. This federal system governs all publicly held invest-
ment companies, and it regulates almost every aspect of their operations, from
their organization and investment of assets to their distribution of shares and
advertising. Although the 1940 Act comprehensively regulates the business and
structure of open-end funds, it does give the SEC broad authority to grant
exemptions from provisions of the Act.
While Congress intended to impose sweeping regulation that the SEC could
modify if modification were in the public interest, the Directive establishes
fundamental regulation that any Member State may build upon. The UCITS
Directive only establishes minimum standards for the regulation of a single type
of investment vehicle. Other types of investment funds may be established, but
they will not receive mutual recognition throughout the Community. The Direc-
tive generally delegates to the Member States the responsibility of administering
the Directive with respect to UCITS situated within their borders, and permits
the Member States to impose more stringent standards with respect to those
UCITS. Each Member State also may promulgate and enforce marketing rules
necessary, in an action by the European Commission or another Member State before the European
Court of Justice. See EEC Treaty, supra note 85, arts 169-170. It also is possible that the UCITS
could bring an action to enforce the Directive in the national courts of the offending state. See UCITS
Directive, supra note 3, § IX art. 51, 2 (requiring Member States to permit adjudication of
"decisions taken in respect of a UCITS pursuant to laws, regulations and administrative provisions
adopted in accordance with this Directive").
87. Id. § VIII, art. 44, 2.
88. Id. § VIII, art. 46. This information includes an attestation by the UCITS' competent
authorities that it complies with the Directive, its fund rules, articles of incorporation, prospectus,
latest annual report and half-yearly reports, and details of the marketing arrangements in the host
state. Id.
89. Id. § VIII, art. 46. These facilities generally are those required by the laws of the host
Member State. Id. § VIII, art. 45.
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with respect to UCITS that market their units within its borders including those
situated in other Member States.
The second significant philosophical difference between the 1940 Act and the
UCITS Directive is that the 1940 Act generally grants voting rights to the
shareholders of open-end funds90 and provides for election of directors by share-
holders, 9' while the Directive does not. 92 Indeed, Article 4 of the UCITS Di-
rective implies that the competent authorities rather than the unit holders are to
select directors.93 While the 1940 Act requires that certain matters be disclosed
and approved by the fund's board of directors and shareholders, the Directive is
silent on many of these issues.
94
90. See 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 18(i), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i).
91. Id. § 16.
92. Investment companies in EC Member States generally do not have boards of directors or
shareholder voting. See Study Release, supra note 4, at n.34.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 100-01.
94. Cf. UCITS Directive, supra note 3, and rule 10f-1 (providing an exemption from § 10(f),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(f) for certain underwriting transactions authorized by a majority of an invest-
ment company's board). But see id. § I, art. 1. 2 (limiting UCITS' business to investment in
securities). The UCITS Directive does require that specified matters be disclosed in the prospectus
and the annual and semi-annual reports. See id., Schedules A and B. There are also three important
matters that the 1940 Act generally regulates through disclosure but the Directive substantively
regulates. First, the UCITS Directive dictates the choice of investment by open-end funds. See id.,
Section V. The Directive generally requires that a UCITS invest only in transferable securities
admitted to official listing on a Member State's stock exchange or dealt in on certain other markets
regulated in a Member State, and in certain types of recently issued transferable securities. Id. art.
19, 1. The UCITS also may invest in transferable securities admitted to official listing on a stock
exchange or dealt in on certain other regulated markets in a non-Member State, provided that the
choice of stock exchange or market is approved by the competent authorities or provided for in law,
the fund rules, or the investment company's instruments of incorporation. Id. The 1940 Act generally
requires only that an investment company disclose its policies and not change fundamental invest-
ment policies without shareholder approval. See 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 8(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-8(b) (disclosure of policies); § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 (change of policies).
Second, the UCITS Directive permits the authorization of UCITS only if the competent authorities
approve the management company, fund rules, instruments of incorporation, and depositary. See
UCITS Directive, supra note IB, § III, art. 4, 2. A "management company must have sufficient
financial resources at its disposal to enable it to conduct its business effectively and meet its liabil-
ities," id. § Ill, art. 5, and may not engage in activities other than the management of unit trusts and
investment companies. Id. § III, art. 6. A depositary must "furnish sufficient financial and profes-
sional guarantees to be able effectively to pursue its business as depositary and meet the commitments
inherent in that function." Id. § III, art. 8, $ 2 (depositaries for unit trusts); § IV, art. 15, 2
(depositaries for investment companies). The management company and depositary also must be
separate entities and must act independently. Id. § III, art. 10 (unit trusts). The same company may
not act as investment company and depositary. § IV, art. 17, 1. The 1940 Act merely names certain
categories of people who are or may be deemed ineligible to hold certain positions, see 1940 Act,
supra note 2, §§ 9(a)-9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a) and (b), and requires that the fund disclose the
identities of the fund's affiliates. Id. § 8(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(4). But see generally id. § 10,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (prohibiting certain affiliated relationships).
Third, the 1940 Act generally regulates advisory fees only through shareholder approval of ad-
visory contracts, id. § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a), and the imposition of a fiduciary duty on the
adviser, id. § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36(b). The UCITS Directive authorizes the competent author-
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The comparatively pervasive regulation of the 1940 Act and the relatively
centralized authority of the SEC mean that any accommodation between the 1940
Act and the UCITS Directive normally must come from the SEC. The European
Community probably would be reluctant to accommodate differences between
the Directive and the 1940 Act, for fear that the whole scheme would unravel in
its infancy. Yet the Community probably would object to any assertion by a
Member State that it had the authority to negotiate a change in the standards in
the Directive. The minimalist approach to the Directive and the diffusion of
administrative responsibility throughout the European Community make inevi-
table the conclusion that the SEC normally would have to take steps to resolve
a conflict between the two regulatory schemes.95
In order to determine what accommodations the SEC would have to make, one
must examine the significant regulatory differences between the 1940 Act and the
UCITS Directive. Some of the incongruities between the two schemes could be
easily resolved. Others are so fundamental that the SEC might not find a com-
promise to be in the public interest. This article attempts to distinguish those
1940 Act provisions that could be accommodated from those with which the SEC
might demand compliance.
a. Investment Company Organization
96
i. Net Worth. The Directive requires that an investment company "have
sufficient paid-up capital to enable it to conduct its business effectively and meet
its liabilities. ' 97 The management company for a unit trust UCITS must meet a
similar test. 98 The 1940 Act imposes a de minimis test by generally requiring that
a registered investment company have a net worth of at least $100,000. 99
ities to approve the amount of the advisory fees. Article 43 of the Directive requires that the fund
rules or the instruments of incorporation prescribe a management company's remuneration and the
method of calculating that remuneration. Since article 4 requires that the competent authorities
approve the fund rules and the instruments of incorporation, the competent authorities also must
approve the management company's fees. UCITS Directive, supra note 3, at art. 43.
95. Since 1987, the Investment Company Institute has engaged in discussions with representa-
tives of the EC mutual fund industry in an effort to reach an agreement providing for a reciprocal
opening of the U.S. and EC markets. See Fair Trade in Financial Services Act: Hearing at the Trade
Subcomm. of the House Ways & Means Comm., 102 Cong., 1st Sess. (July 29, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Fednews file) (statement of Matthew P. Fink, Senior Vice President & General Counsel,
Investment Company Institute (ICI)). The ICI apparently hopes to model any agreement on the
UCITS Directive.
In 1991, the SEC and the EC signed a joint statement declaring their "intention to work together
to promote efforts by the SEC and the national authorities of the European Community" and to begin
a "regular dialogue" between the SEC and the EC Commission. Joint Statement on the Establish-
ment of Improved Cooperation Between the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Commission of the European Communities (Sept. 23, 1991).
96. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the staff of the Division of Investment
Management, Securities and Exchange Commission, for its assistance in the following comparison
of the UCITS Directive and the 1940 Act.
97. UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § IV, art. 12.
98. See id. § III, art. 5.
99. 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14.
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ii. Voting and Board Selection. The Directive does not grant voting rights
to unit holders or provide for election of directors by unit holders.' 0 Section
18(i) of the 1940 Act generally requires that every investment company share be
a voting share, and section 16 generally requires shareholder election of board
members. Section 10(a) requires every investment company to have a board of
directors at least 40 percent of whom are persons who are not interested persons
of the investment company. Section 9(a) prohibits certain persons from serving
as director, and section 9(b) authorizes the Commission to bar certain persons
from serving as director. The Directive authorizes the competent authorities to
pass on the good repute and experience of the directors. '0 ' Section 20 of the 1940
Act generally regulates proxy solicitation by investment companies, prohibits the
sale of voting trust certificates with respect to investment company securities,
and prohibits cross and circular ownership of voting securities. The UCITS
Directive does not contain similar provisions.
iii. Fidelity Bonds. Section 17(g) of the 1940 Act authorizes the Commis-
sion to require that certain officers or employees of investment companies be
covered by a bond against larceny and embezzlement issued by a reputable
fidelity insurance company. Rule 17g- 1 generally requires registered manage-
ment investment companies to maintain a bond for certain covered persons. 102
The Directive does not contain a similar provision,
iv. Indemnification. Section 17(h) of the 1940 Act prohibits the indemni-
fication of an investment company's officers and directors against liability due to
willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence, or reckless disregard of the
duties involved in the conduct of their offices. Section 17(i) prohibits similar
indemnification of investment advisers and principal underwriters. The Directive
does not contain similar prohibitions, but it does make the depositary liable, in
accordance with the laws of the UCITS' home state, for its unjustifiable failure
to perform or the improper performance of its obligations. 
10 3
v. Fiduciary Duties. Section 36(a) of the 1940 Act authorizes the SEC to
bring an injunctive action alleging that an officer, director, adviser, depositor,
or principal underwriter has within the past five years or is about to "engage
in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving per-
sonal misconduct in respect of any registered investment company for which
such person so serves or acts." Section 36(b) generally imposes a fiduciary
duty on an investment adviser of a registered investment company with respect
to the receipt of compensation or material payments by the investment com-
pany or its security holders to the investment adviser or any of its affiliated
persons.
100. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
101. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § II, art. 4, $ 3.
102. See rule 17g-1 (17 C.F.R. § 70.17g-1).
103. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § 1IM, art. 9 (unit trusts); § IV, art. 16 (investment
companies).
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The UCITS Directive imposes a duty upon management companies and de-
positaries to act solely in the unit holders' interest. 1°4 The depositary also is
liable to the management company or investment company and the unit holders
for any loss suffered by them as a result of the depositary's unjustifiable failure
to perform its obligations or its improper performance of them. 10 5 This liability
apparently may be limited by the Member State in which the registered office of
the management company or investment company is situated.' 06
b. Issuance of Securities
Section 18(f) of the 1940 Act generally prohibits open-end funds from issuing
or selling any senior security, which is defined to include most forms of debt and
stock of a class having priority over any other class as to distribution of assets or
payment of dividends.10 7 The SEC staff also takes the position that uncovered
short sales create senior securities that are subject to the section 18 limitations. 10 8
The UCITS Directive does not explicitly prohibit the issuance or sale of senior
securities, 1°9 but it generally prohibits UCITS from borrowing or engaging in
uncovered sales. 1 o The 1940 Act permits limited borrowing.
1 1
'
104. See id. § III, art. 10, 2 (unit trusts); §IV, art. 17, 2 (investment companies). The
Directive expressly requires depositaries of unit trusts, but not investment companies, to act "inde-
pendently." Cf. id. § III, art. 10, 9 2 and § IV, art. 17, 9 2. Some commentators have speculated that
the omission in article 17 is an oversight, particularly in light of the Directive's requirement that the
depositary of both a unit trust and an investment company act solely in the interests of the unit-
holders. See Van Damme, supra note 79, at 35.
105. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § 1II, art. 9 (unit trusts); § IV, art. 16 (investment
companies).
106. See id. § III, art. 9; § IV, art. 16. The Directive generally requires unit trusts and investment
companies to have depositaries. See id. § III, art. 7, 1 (unit trusts); § IV, art. 14, 9 1 (investment
companies). The Directive provides an exception for certain investment companies. A Member State
may exempt investment companies situated in its territory and that market their units exclusively
through one or more stock exchanges on which their units are admitted to official listing. See id. §
IV, art. 14, $ 4. A Member State also may exempt investment companies within its territory that
market at least 80 percent of their units through one or more stock exchanges designated in their
instruments of incorporation. See id. § IV, art. 14, 5. The units of these latter investment
companies must be admitted to official listing on the stock exchanges of the Member States within
the territories in which their units are marketed. Id. Any transactions by the company in its units
outside the stock exchanges must be effected at stock exchange prices only. Id.
107. 1940 Act, supra note 2, § § 18(f)-18(g), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f), (g). Section 18 permits a
company to borrow from any bank provided that it maintains a 300 percent asset coverage. See id.
§ 18(f)(1).
108. See Guide 9 to Form N-IA, citing Investment Company Act Release No. 7221, 37 Fed. Reg.
12,790 (1972).
109. Schedule A of the UCITS Directive, which describes the information that must be in
UCITS' prospectus, requires a description of the "types" of units. This reference implies that a
UCITS may issue more than one class or series of security, although it is unclear whether any class
or series may be senior to another as to income or distribution on liquidation. UCITS Directive,
supia note 3, sched. A.
110. See id. § VII, art. 42 (uncovered sales); § VII, art. 36, 1 (borrowing). A UCITS may
acquire foreign currency by means of a "back-to-back" loan. Although the Directive does not define
this term, it apparently means a loan denominated in foreign currency taken with a simultaneous deposit
with the lender of an equal or greater amount denominated in the UCITS' currency.
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c. Investments by Investment Companies and UCITS
i. Diversification. The diversification standards under the 1940 Act 1 2 are
generally more stringent than the diversification standards in the Directive, and
the Directive permits Member States to liberalize those standards. In order to be
a diversified management investment company under the 1940 Act, at least 75
percent of the value of a company's assets must consist of certain cash and
cash-related items, government securities, securities of other investment com-
panies, and other securities that may be held subject to certain limitations. These
limitations are that no more than 5 percent of the value of the investment com-
pany's assets may be held in these securities with respect to a single issuer, and
no more than 10 percent of that issuer's voting securities may be so held. 1 3 The
UCITS Directive generally requires that UCITS invest only in various types of
transferable securities. 114 The Directive also prohibits the investment of more
than 5 percent of a UCITS' assets in transferable securities issued by the same
body. 115 The UCITS Directive prohibits a UCITS from acquiring voting shares
that would enable it to exercise significant influence over the issuer's manage-
The Member States may authorize UCITS to borrow temporarily up to 10 percent of their assets
or fund value. Id. § VII, art. 36, 2. The Member States also may authorize investment companies
to borrow up to 10 percent of their assets for the purchase of "immovable property essential for the
direct pursuit of [the UCITS'] business." Id. The total amount of these two types of borrowings
may not exceed 15 percent of the UCITS' assets. Id.
11. See supra note 107.
112. The 1940 Act defines "diversified company" as a management company that meets the
diversification standards. See 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 5(b)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1). The 1940
Act does not require "non-diversified" companies to meet those standards. See id. § 5(b)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(2) (defining "non-diversified company" as "any management company other
than a diversified company").
113. Id. § 5(b)(l). Section 12(d)(1) also limits the ability of an investment company to purchase
the voting stock of another investment company. See infra text accompanying note 121. The Internal
Revenue Code also imposes diversification requirements on so-called "regulated investment com-
panies" (RICs). The Code generally requires that at least 50 percent of a RIC's assets be invested
in cash, Government securities, and securities of other RICs, or in other securities. I.R.C.
§ 851(b)(4)(A) (1988). The level at which the RIC may invest in these other securities of one issuer is
generally limited to 5 percent of the RIC's assets and 10 percent of the issuer's outstanding voting
securities. Id. The RIC also generally may not invest more than 25 percent of its assets in securities
(other than Government securities or securities issued by other RICs) of any one issuer, or of two or
more issuers controlled by the RIC and determined to be engaged in similar or related businesses. Id.
§ 85 l(b)(4)(B). The tax diversification rules would not apply to UCITS, since RICs must be domestic
corporations. Id. § 851(a).
114. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § V, article 19, 1. The Directive does provide for
limited investment in other securities and property. See id. § V, art. 19, 2.
115. See id. § V, art. 22, 1. The Member States may raise the limit to 10 percent, provided that
the total value of all investments that exceed the 5 percent level does not exceed 40 percent of the
value of the UCITS' assets. See id. t 2. The Member States also may raise the limit to 35 percent
if the transferable securities are issued or guaranteed by a Member State, its local authorities, a
non-Member State, or public international bodies of which one or more Member States are members.
See id. 3. Member States may raise the limit to 25 percent in the case of certain bonds that
are subject to special public supervision designed to protect bond holders. See Council Directive
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ment. 116 A UCITS also may not acquire more than 10 percent of the nonvoting
shares of any single issuing body.' 1
7
ii. Purchases on Margin; Joint Purchases; Short Sales. The 1940 Act
generally prohibits investment companies from purchasing securities on margin,
participating on a joint or joint and several basis in any securities trading ac-
count, or effecting a short sale of any security." 8 Although the UCITS Directive
does not specifically prohibit margining or joint securities trading, it does gen-
erally prohibit borrowing119 and uncovered sales of securities by UCITS or their
management companies or depositaries. 12
0
iii. Investments. Section 12(d)(1) of the 1940 Act restricts the investment
by an investment company in other investment companies. Section 12(d)(1)
generally provides that an investment company may not invest more than 5
percent of its assets in securities issued by another investment company, may not
own more than 3 percent of the total voting stock of the acquired company, and
may not own in the aggregate securities issued by investment companies repre-
senting over 10 percent of the value of its total assets. 1 21 The Directive prohibits
the investment in UCITS not covered by the Directive. 122 Moreover, a UCITS
may invest no more than 5 percent of its assets in the units of other UCITS.
123
The Directive does not specifically limit a UCITS' investment in the voting
securities of a single UCITS. However, it does generally prohibit the acquisition
of more than 5 percent of its assets in a single issuer1 24 and the acquisition of
88/220 of 22 March 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 100) 31 (amending the UCITS Directive). The Member
States even may permit investment of 100 percent of a UCITS' assets in those transferable securities
if the competent authorities consider that the unit holders have protection equivalent to that of unit
holders in UCITS complying with the other limits. UCITS with a 100 percent limit must hold
securities from at least six different issues, and securities of any one issue may not account for more
than 30 percent of its total assets. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § V, art. 23, 1. Such a
UCITS must state in its rules or articles of incorporation and disclose in its prospectus and adver-
tisements the identities of issuers and guarantors in which it invests more than 35 percent of its assets.
Id. 2-3.
116. id. § V, art. 25, 1.
117. See id. $ 2. A UCITS also may not acquire more than 10 percent of the debt securities of any
single issuing body or 10 percent of the units of any UCITS. Id. These limits may be disregarded if
at the time of acquisition the amount of debt securities or the net amount of the securities in issue
cannot be calculated. Id.
118. See 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a).
119. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § VII, art. 36, V 1.
120. See id. art. 41, $ 2 (UCITS may acquire securities not fully paid); art. 42 (prohibition of
uncovered sales).
121. Sections 12(d)(1)(D) and (E) of the 1940 Act, supra note 2, generally exempt securities
received as a dividend or as a result of an approved offer of exchange or plan of reorganization and
securities that constitute the only investment securities held by the investment company, from the
prohibition. The UCITS Directive does not provide similar exemptions.
122. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § V, art. 24, 1.
123. See id., 2. The Directive limits a UCITS' ability to invest in another UCITS that is related
by common management, control, or substantial holding. See id.
124. See id. § V, art. 22, 1.
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voting shares that would enable it to exercise significant influence over the
issuer. 125
Section 12(d)(2) generally prohibits investment companies from purchasing
securities issued by most insurance companies if the investment company will
own more than 10 percent of the insurance company's outstanding voting stock.
Section 12(d)(3) generally prohibits investment companies from purchasing se-
curities issued by brokers or dealers, underwriters, investment advisers to in-
vestment companies, or registered investment advisers. Section 12(d)(3) pro-
vides two exceptions. One is for corporations whose outstanding securities are,
or after the acquisition will be owned by registered investment companies. The
other exception is for persons primarily engaged in the business of underwriting
and distributing securities issued by other persons, selling securities to custom-
ers, or related activities, if their gross income is normally derived principally
from such business or related activities. The UCITS Directive does not specif-
ically restrict a UCITS' purchase of securities issued by insurance companies,
broker-dealers, or investment advisers.
iv. Investment Policies. Section 13 of the 1940 Act provides that unless a
majority of the outstanding voting shares vote otherwise, an investment company
may not deviate from: (1) any investment policy that is changeable only if
authorized by shareholder vote; (2) any policy regarding concentration of invest-
ments recited in its registration statement; or (3) any policy stated in its regis-
tration statement concerning matters that the investment company deems to be of
fundamental policy. The Directive does not contain a similar provision. The
Directive does require that the competent authorities approve amendments to the
fund rules and instruments of incorporation. 126 The fund rules or instruments of
incorporation presumably would describe a UCITS' investment policy. 127 More-
over, the depositary is required to ensure that a UCITS' income is applied
according to the law and its fund rules or instruments of incorporation. 28
d. Other Activities
i. Underwriting. The 1940 Act restricts the ability of registered diversified
companies to make underwriting commitments.' 29 The UCITS Directive does
125. See id. § V, art. 25, 1. Section 12(d)(1)(B) of the 1940 Act, supra note 2, generally
prohibits the disposition of open-end investment company securities to another investment company
that would own more than 3 percent of the acquired company's voting stock or if more than 10
percent of that stock would be owned by investment companies. Similarly, § 12(d)(l)(C) generally
prohibits any investment company from acquiring securities issued by a closed-end investment
company if the acquiring company and other investment companies with the same investment adviser
would own more than 10 percent of the total outstanding voting stock of the closed-end company. The
UCITS Directive does not contain provisions similar to § 12(d)(1)(B) and (C).
126. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § II, art. 4, $ 4.
127. Cf. id. § V, art. 24, 3 (investments in commonly managed unit trusts must be stated in fund
rules).
128. See id. § II, art. 7, V 3 (unit trusts); art. 14, 3 (investment companies).
129. 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 12(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(c).
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not contain a similar prohibition, although it does limit a UCITS' business to
investment in securities.'
30
ii. Lending. The 1940 Act prohibits any registered management company
from lending money or property if its investment policies do not permit the loan
or if the borrower controls or is under common control with the company (unless
the borrower owns all of the company's outstanding securities).13' The UCITS
Directive prohibits a UCITS from lending money or guaranteeing the debt of any
third party. 1
32
e. Affiliated Relationships and Transactions
i. Affiliations among Associated Persons. Section 10 of the 1940 Act pro-
hibits certain affiliations among investment companies, investment advisers,
regular brokers, principal underwriters, and their associated persons. For exam-
ple, section 10(b) generally prohibits a registered investment company from em-
ploying as a broker or dealer any director, officer, or employee or any person of
which any such director, officer, or employee is an affiliate. Section 10(f) gen-
erally prohibits acquisitions by registered investment companies of certain se-
curities a principal underwriter of which is an officer, director, advisory board
member, investment adviser, or employee of the investment company, or is a
person of which any such person is an affiliate. The UCITS Directive does not
contain restrictions on affiliations similar to Section 10.
ii. Affiliated Transactions. The 1940 Act generally prohibits affiliated per-
sons, promoters, or principal underwriters of registered investment companies,
and their affiliates, from engaging in certain sales by or to, loans from, and joint
transactions with registered investment companies, and from receiving certain
sales commissions from those companies.' 33 The UCITS Directive does not
specifically restrict affiliated transactions. The Directive does limit investment in
the units of a unit trust managed by the same management company or by any
company linked with the management company by common management or
control, or by a substantial holding. Such an investment may be permitted only
by a unit trust that specializes in investment in a specific geographical area or
economic sector, and provided that the competent authorities authorize such
investment. ' 
34
The Directive also prohibits a management company from changing fees or
costs arising from transactions in a unit trust's units when some of the unit trust's
assets are invested in the units of another unit trust managed by the same
management company or any other company with which the management com-
130. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3 § I, art. 1, 2.
131. See 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-21.
132. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § VII, art. 41.
133. See 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17.
134. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § V, art. 24, 3.
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pany is so linked. 135 Both of these provisions also apply when an investment
company acquires units in another investment company with which it is so
linked, when an investment company acquires units of a unit trust to which it is
linked, and when a unit trust acquires units of an investment company to which
it is linked. 136 The Directive does impose liability on depositaries for improper
performance of their obligations 137 and requires depositaries to act "solely in the
interests of the unit-holders." 
138
f. Retail Activities
i. Distribution. The 1940 Act generally prohibits an open-end company
from acting as distributor of its securities except through an underwriter, in
contravention of SEC rules. 139 The UCITS Directive does not contain a similar
provision. Indeed, the Directive apparently allows UCITS to market their own
shares and pay the distribution costs. 140
ii. Retail Price Maintenance. Section 22(d) of the 1940 Act generally
prohibits the sale of redeemable investment company securities except at a cur-
rent public offering price described in the prospectus. Rule 22c-1, promulgated
under section 22(c) of the 1940 Act, generally requires that the issuance and
redemption price of investment company shares be equal to the net asset value
calculated after receipt of a purchase or redemption order. The UCITS Directive
does not require retail price maintenance or forward pricing. Article 38 of the
Directive provides that the rules for the valuation of assets and for calculating the
sale or issue price and the repurchase or redemption price of the units of a UCITS
must be laid down in the law or in the fund rules or in the instruments of
incorporation, which the competent authorities must approve. 
14 1
g. Financial Statements and Accounting
Both the 1940 Act and the UCITS Directive require the filing of certified
financial statements. 142 The 1940 Act generally requires that investment com-
panies value their assets at the current market value. 143 The Directive does not
135. Id. In a statement in the minutes of the EC Council of Ministers' deliberations on the
Directive, the Council and the EC Commission state that those fees and costs include not only
securities commissions but management and consultancy commissions. See Van Damme, supra note
79, at 58.
136. UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § V, art. 24, 3.
137. See id. § IV, art. 16.
138. See id. art. 17, 2.
139. See 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(b).
140. See, e.g., UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § VIII (special provisions applicable to UCITS
that market their units in other Member States).
141. See id. § II, art. 4, 2.
142. Cf. 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 30(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30(e) and UCITS Directive, supra note
3, § VI, art. 31.
143. See, e.g., 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 30(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30(d) (requiring semi-annual
stockholder reports with values of investments as of the date of the balance sheet); 1940 Act,
§ 2(a)(41)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(b) (generally defining "value" as market value); see also
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prescribe the accounting rules that must be followed. 144 They presumably are to
be promulgated by the competent authorities of the UCITS' home state. ' 45 The
Directive does require the UCITS to describe in its prospectus the rules for
determining and applying the UCITS' income and for the valuation of the
UCITS' assets. 146 The Directive also provides that the annual report must in-
clude a balance sheet or a statement of assets and liabilities, a detailed income
and expenditure account for the financial year, and other information. 1
47
3. Conclusion
The SEC's ability to exempt a UCITS from a provision of the 1940 Act
obviously would depend upon the manner in which section 7(d) is amended. For
the sake of this discussion this article assumes that section 7(d) is amended as
proposed by the Commission in its 1984 legislative proposal. The Commission
thus would have to determine that the UCITS' governing law provides investor
protections that serve the same purposes as the exempted provision or that special
conditions agreed to by the company provide such protections. 1
48
The Commission's willingness to grant an exemption also would depend upon
the circumstances of each application, including the ability of the Commission
and shareholders effectively to inspect the UCITS and to enforce the Act against
the UCITS and its affiliated persons. 149 Moreover, as previously discussed, the
Member States may impose more stringent regulation than the standards in the
Directive, and this regulation may conflict with the 1940 Act, be consistent with
the 1940 Act, or serve the same purpose as provisions of the 1940 Act.
With these caveats in mind, one can generally distinguish those areas in which
some accommodation might be made from those in which resolution would be
more intractable. The SEC might be able to grant exemptive relief from sections
16, 18(i), and 20 to a UCITS that does not provide voting rights to its unit
Regulation S-X, rule 6-03(d), 7 C.F.R. § 210.6-03(d) (generally requiring balance sheets to reflect
all investments "at value"); Regulation S-X, rule 6-02(b), 17 C.F.R. § 210.6-02(b) (defining
"value" in art. 6 same as § 2(a)(41)(B) of the 1940 Act).
144. See, e.g, UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § VII, art. 38 (requiring that "rules for the
valuation of assets" be laid down in law, the fund rules, or the investment company's instruments of
incorporation. See also id. sched. A, item 1. 16 (requiring description of "[riules for the valuation of
assets").
145. The Directive authorizes the establishment of a "contact committee" composed of appoin-
tees of the Member States and EC Commission representatives. See id. § X, art. 53. In the EC
Council's minutes of its deliberations on the Directive, the Council and EC Commission took the
view that one of the most important tasks of the contact committee is to achieve comparability of the
accounting information to be given to the public. See Van Damme, supra note 79, at 114.
146. See UCITS Directive, supra note 3, sched. A, 1.14, 1.16.
147. See id. § VI, art. 28, 2; sched. B.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60. The Commission also would have to determine
that compliance with the 1940 Act provision would be unduly burdensome, the exemption is con-
sistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policies of the 1940
Act, and the UCITS is not operated to evade the 1940 Act. Id.
149. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing rule 7d-1).
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holders. The basis of this relief might be the competent authorities' responsibility
to pass on the good repute and experience of the directors and to approve the
UCITS' management company, fund rules, instruments of incorporation, and
depositary. On similar grounds, the SEC might grant an exemption from sections
8(b)(2) and (3) and section 13 with respect to deviations from investment policy
without a shareholder vote, from Section 8(b)(4) with respect to the identification
of affiliated persons in the registration statement, and from Section 15(a) with
respect to the shareholder approval of advisory contracts.
An exemption from the de minimis net worth test in section 14 should not be
necessary, given the more substantive standards in the Directive. An exemption
from the lending restrictions in section 21 also should not be necessary, since the
Directive prohibits any lending or guarantee of third-party debt by a UCITS. The
investment limitations in the Directive (perhaps supplemented by additional con-
ditions required by the SEC) might satisfy the conditions for an exemption from
sections 5(b)(1) and 12(d)(1), provided that the competent authorities have not
increased the 5 percent limitation on the investment of a UCITS' assets in
securities of the same issuer.
Resolution might be considerably more difficult with respect to any significant
differences between the accounting principles and auditing standards used by the
UCITS and generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) in the United States. Inconsistent account-
ing principles and auditing standards, if not reconciled, could deprive unit hold-
ers of a meaningful basis to understand the financial statements of a UCITS and
to compare them to domestically organized funds.
Resolution also would be difficult if the UCITS is unable to comply with the
restrictions on affiliated transactions and relationships, with the distribution lim-
itations in section 12(b) and related rules, or with the forward pricing require-
ments of rule 22c- 1, unless it could offer some substitute protection. Moreover,
differences in accounting, permitted affiliations, distribution, and pricing are so
fundamental to the structure or operations of a UCITS that in many cases an
existing UCITS that does not already comply with those 1940 Act provisions
could not change its structure or operations in order to do so. Complying with
GAAP, GAAS, and the Commission's rules on affiliations, distributions, and
pricing would likely prove too costly to some UCITS, but ignoring them would
be considered too dangerous to the U.S. investor.
A comparison of the UCITS Directive and the 1940 Act thus indicates that
significant impediments to the entry of UCITS would remain even if section 7(d)
were amended along the lines of the Commission's 1984 proposal. Even if such
an amendment augmented the SEC's authority to accommodate UCITS, 150 the
150. As discussed above, this author questions whether the 1984 proposal would substantially
augment the Commission's current authority under section 6(c) to exempt UCITS from particular
provisions of the Act. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
FALL 1992
654 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
potential for accommodation still would be limited. Moreover, other legal ob-
stacles would continue to thwart the offering of UCITS in the United States.
C. OTHER BARRIERS TO ENTRY
The 1940 Act is not the only barrier to the sale of UCITS in the United States.
The Investment Advisers Act and the Internal Revenue Code also may discour-
age the sale of UCITS in the United States. 51 This part of the article discusses
the principal provisions in these statutes that would affect the ability of UCITS
to offer their units in the United States.
1. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
a. Application of the Act to UCITS Advisers
If UCITS were permitted to offer their shares in the United States, some of
them (particularly those that intend to invest some of their assets in U.S. secu-
rities 52) presumably would have U.S. advisers or sub-advisers. If these advisers
fall within the definition of investment adviser in section 202(a)(1 1) of the
Investment Advisers Act (Advisers Act),15 3 and they use the jurisdictional means
in connection with their business, then they must register under the Act unless
they qualify for an exemption from registration. 154 Although some U.S. advisers
to UCITS might qualify for one of the exemptions, most of them probably would
not. 155
Of greater concern to most UCITS would be the fact that their foreign adviser
might have to register under the Advisers Act. Assuming that the foreign adviser
uses the jurisdictional means in connection with its business1 56 and the UCITS
151. Other possible impediments, which are not discussed in this article, include state blue sky
laws and federal banking law.
152. As discussed above, a UCITS generally may invest up to 10 percent of its assets in securities
listed on a stock exchange or dealt in on certain regulated markets in a non-Member State. See supra
note 94.
153. Section 202(a)(1 1) generally defines "investment adviser" as
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others... as to the value of securities or
as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or seling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a
regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities ....
Section 202(a)(1 1) exempts domestic, but not foreign banks from the definition of "investment
adviser." See Investment Advisers Act, supra note 58, § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11);
§ 202(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(2) (definition of "bank").
154. See id. § 203.
155. For example, § 203(b)(3) generally exempts an investment adviser who during the preceding
twelve months has had fewer than fifteen clients and who neither holds himself out generally to the
public as an investment adviser "nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company
registered under [the Investment Company Act]." Section 203(b)(3) presumably would not be avail-
able for an adviser to a UCITS, since even if § 7(d) were amended to permit greater access to the U.S.
markets, it probably would require a UCITS to register before publicly offering its units in the United
States. See supra text accompanying notes 75 and 76.
156. In the author's opinion, it is possible that a foreign adviser who makes only limited use of
the jurisdictional means on behalf of the UCITS would not be required to register. For example, the
staff has taken a no-action position with respect to a foreign adviser that receives information about
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registers under the Investment Company Act, then the foreign adviser normally
would have to register1 57 and comply with the provisions of the Act with respect
to both its foreign and U.S. clients.' 58 The Advisers Act is principally an anti-
fraud statute, 159 and the foreign adviser generally would be subject to the dis-
closure requirements of the Act with respect to both its domestic and foreign
securities and telephones U.S. brokers to effect transactions in U.S. securities through the jurisdic-
tional means without registering under the Advisers Act. See Double D. Management, Ltd., 43 SEC
Docket 464 (1982). It is also possible that the Commission would require use of the jurisdictional
means as a condition to the registration of the UCITS. Cf. rule 7d- l(b)(9)(ii) supra note 14 (requiring
that advisory and other contracts with applicants provide that "[in effecting the purchase or sale of
assets the parties thereto will utilize the United States mails or means of interstate commerce").
157. Registration would not be required if an exemption is available, but in most cases no
exemption would be. See supra note 155 (discussing unavailability of § 203(b)(3) exception to
adviser to registered UCITS).
158. See Study Release, supra note 4, at 878. "The Division of Investment Management takes the
view that, once registered, a foreign adviser is subject to all of the provisions of the Advisers Act with
respect to both its United States clients and its foreign clients." Id.; see also Gim-Seong Seow, 43
SEC Docket 519, 520 (1987); Response of the Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Investment
Management, Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Rule 205-3 (October 29, 1986) (copy
available from the author).
Although the Advisers Act generally applies only to activities in which the jurisdictional means are
used, § 203(d) applies the prohibitions of the Advisers Act to any act by a registered adviser, even
if the adviser does not use the jurisdictional means. Id. Section 203(d) could be read to subject
registered foreign advisers to the prohibitions of the Act even when they do not use the jurisdictional
means. Id. But see E. Greene, et al., Jurisdictional Reach of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
INsIGHts, Oct. 1990, at 21-22 (arguing against such a reading of § 203(d)).
A UCITS might want to register its foreign adviser so that it can act as a distributor of its units
under section 12(b). Section 12(b) generally prohibits an open-end investment company from dis-
tributing its securities, except through an underwriter, in contravention of the Commission's rules.
The Commission's rule 12b- 1, 17 C.F.R. § 170.12b-1 generally prohibits any registered open-end
management investment company from acting as a distributor of its securities except through an
underwriter. Both § 12(b) and rule 12b-I except companies complying with § 10(d). Section 10(d)
permits an investment company to have a board of directors all of whom, except one, are interested
persons of its adviser or are officers or employees of the company, provided certain conditions are
met. Among these conditions is the requirement that there be only one adviser to the investment
company, including sub-advisers, see 1940 Act, supra note 2, § 2(a)(20), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20)
(defining "investment adviser" of an investment company to include sub-advisers), and that the
adviser be registered under the Advisers Act. See id. § 10(d)(2). Of course, if the UCITS' adviser
registers under the Advisers Act, then it would be required to comply with the substantive provisions
of that Act, even with respect to its foreign clients. See infra text accompanying notes 159-62
(discussing Advisers Act requirements). A UCITS might prefer to hire a U.S. registered broker-
dealer to underwrite its units in the United States. U.S. broker-dealers might be reluctant to act as
underwriter for the UCITS, particularly if it would compete with the funds that the broker-dealers
already distribute.
159. See, e.g., Gim-Seong Seow, 43 SEC Docket at 490 (referring to the "primarily antifraud
purposes of the Advisers Act").
The Advisers Act does not impose any specific capital requirements on registered advisers. Rule
206(4)-4(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-4(a)(1) does require any adviser with discretionary authority
or custody over a client's funds or securities to disclose to any client and any prospective client "all
material facts with respect to [a] financial condition of the adviser that is reasonably likely to impair
the ability of the adviser to meet contractual commitments to clients. ... An adviser is required
to pay a fee of only U.S. $150 with its registration application. See rule 203-3(a), 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.203-3(a).
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clients. The Advisers Act also substantively regulates the advisory relationship in
certain respects. Many foreign advisers will find most difficult the restrictions on
performance-based fees. 160 The Act generally prohibits any registered adviser
from entering advisory contracts that provide for compensation based on the
capital gains or appreciation of the client's funds. 161 In addition to complying
with the disclosure requirements and substantive provisions of the Advisers Act,
the adviser must either preserve its required books and records in the United
States or undertake to furnish those books and records upon demand of the
Commission staff. 
1 62
b. Establishment of U.S. Affiliates
Foreign advisers generally have avoided the registration and other require-
ments of the Advisers Act, and the application of the Act to their relationships
with foreign clients, by establishing independent advisory affiliates that register
under the Act and provide advisory services to the foreign advisers' U.S. cli-
ents. 163 In so doing the foreign adviser must be wary that the foreign and U.S.
entities are sufficiently independent, so that the SEC will not look through the
U.S. affiliate to regulate the foreign adviser under the Act. Section 208(d) of the
Advisers Act prohibits any person from doing "indirectly, or through or by any
other person" anything that it would be unlawful to do directly under the Act or
the rules thereunder. In some circumstances, if a foreign adviser establishes a
U.S. affiliate to use the jurisdictional means in connection with its advisory
business, then under section 208(d) the foreign adviser might be deemed to be
160. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 158, at 24-25 (discussing inconsistency between performance
fee restrictions and practices of many foreign advisers).
161. Advisers Act, supra note 58, § 205(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 80b-5(a)(1). Section 205 permits an
adviser to a registered investment company to enter into a contract providing "fulcrum fees." These
fees are based on the company's asset value over a definite period and they increase and decrease
proportionately with the investment performance in relation to an appropriate index. Moreover, rule
205-3, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3) provides a safe harbor from § 205 for certain types of investment
advisory contracts. The safe harbor is not available for contracts with a registered investment com-
pany unless all of the equity owners meet the eligibility requirements of the rule, see rule 205-3(b)(2),
17 C.F.R. § 205-3(b)(2), and all of the provisions of the rule are met with respect to foreign as well
as domestic investors in the company. See Response of the Office of Chief Counsel, supra note 158.
The Commission staff has issued a no-action letter to a registered sub-adviser that charged
performance-based fees to a foreign investment trust. See Nikko Securities Investment Trust &
Management Co., Ltd., 43 SEC Docket 491 (1985). In Nikko, the requester represented that it would
have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish a separate and independent U.S.
advisory subsidiary, and that the remuneration was specified in the trust deed for the foreign trust and
had to be approved by the Japanese Minister of Finance. Id. Moreover, the trust's interests were sold
only in Japan. Id.
162. See Rule 204-2(j), 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(j). Cf. Investment Company Act Release No.
17769, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,100 (Oct. 1, 1990) (proposing amendments to rule 31a-2 of the 1940 Act to
require U.S. investment companies to preserve certain books and records in the United States, in the
English language).
163. See, e.g., Davis, Polk & Wardwell, Comment Letter to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Re: Reform of the Regulation of Investment Companies 28 (1990) (letter on file at the SEC).
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acting indirectly through the U.S. affiliate in violation of the registration provi-
sion in section 203(a).164
In 1981 the staff stated that in order to avoid the registration and other pro-
visions of the Advisers Act, the foreign adviser generally must ensure that a U.S.
subsidiary: (1) is adequately capitalized; (2) has a buffer between it and the
foreign adviser, such as a board of directors a majority of whose members are
independent of the parent; (3) has no employees, officers, or directors engaged
both in its daily advisory business and in the advisory business of the parent;
(4) itself decides what advice to give its clients and uses sources of information
not limited to its parent; and (5) keeps its advice confidential until communicated
to its clients.1 65 The staff subsequently granted numerous no-action requests
based on Richard Ellis, 166 until it adopted a policy of not responding to no-action
requests concerning the application of section 208(d) and the Richard Ellis
criteria to specific facts. 1
67
Whether the Richard Ellis requirements must be met when the foreign adviser
is under common control with, but does not control, the U.S. adviser is unclear.
In Double D. Management, Ltd. 168 David H. Baker, Jr., a U.S. citizen resident
in the Cayman Islands, was the controlling owner of Double D., a Cayman
Islands investment adviser, and the sole owner of two U.S. registered advisers,
Forty Four Management, Ltd. (44 Ltd.) and Forty Four Management, Inc. (44
Inc.).169 Double D. advised a foreign investment company and charged a per-
formance fee for its advice. 170 Baker provided or supervised all of the manage-
ment services of 44 Inc. and, along with one other person, provided the invest-
ment advice rendered by 44 Ltd. and Double D. 7 ' The applicant's letter did not
represent that 44 Ltd. and 44 Inc. were adequately capitalized, that an adequate
buffer existed between Double D. and 44 Ltd. and 44 Inc., or that Double D.
kept confidential its investment advice.
The staff determined that neither Baker, 44 Inc., nor 44 Ltd. violated section
205 when Double D. used the jurisdictional means to carry out a performance fee
contract. 172 The two registered advisers, 44 Inc. and 44 Ltd., did not have an
investment in Double D. Baker owned Double D, but he was not required to
164. See Richard Ellis, 43 SEC Docket 455, 456 (1981).
165. Id.; Wardley Marine Int'l Investment Management (1982) (LEXIS, Fed Sec library, No-Act
file); Gartmore Investment (1981) (LEXIS, Fed Sec library, No-Act file); County Bank Ltd. (1981)
(LEXIS, Fed Sec library, No-Act file).
166. See, e.g., Gartmore Investment, County Bank Ltd.
167. See, e.g., Hill Samuel Investment Management (1983) (LEXIS, Fed Sec library, No-Act
file).
168. Double D. Management, Ltd., 43 SEC Docket 464 (1982).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 471.
172. Id. at 472.
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register. Consequently, the staff reasoned that neither Baker, 44 Inc., nor 44 Ltd.
could be deemed to be doing indirectly (charging a performance fee) what they
could not do directly. The staff did note that Baker would be doing through the
three firms together what he could not do directly: acting as a registered adviser
and charging a performance fee. 173 The staff nevertheless granted no-action
assurance, reasoning that:
[n]o part of the Act, including section 208, suggests that there is a policy under the
Act of preventing a person from doing a thing which a non-investment adviser can
do, or an unregistered investment adviser can do, merely because the person owns a
registered investment adviser which cannot do the thing or is a person which is
owned by a person who owns a registered investment adviser which cannot do a
thing. 74
This conclusion seems to disregard the natural implication of Richard Ellis,
that a person can be prevented from engaging in certain activities that an
unregistered adviser may do by virtue of that person's close relationship to a
registered adviser. In 1988 the staff issued a no-action letter that implied that
the Richard Ellis test would govern facts similar to those in Double D. 1
75
In Hambrick, a U.S. citizen, Henry P. Hambrick, wholly owned a Swiss
investment adviser, Pajolo, which advised foreign clients. Hambrick also wholly
owned a registered U.S. investment adviser and advised both entities. The Com-
mission staff refused to grant no-action assurances on the grounds that the relief
requested was retrospective and the staff provides only prospective assur-
ances. 176 The staff also stated that:
an issue under section 208(d) could be raised where an individual, who is a U.S.
resident, provides advisory services to foreign clients through an unregistered wholly-
owned foreign corporation, particularly if the individual also provides advice to U.S.
clients through another wholly-owned corporation registered as an adviser with the
Commission. 1
77
The Double D. and Hambrick positions could be reconciled by the fact that in
Double D. Baker was a non-U.S. resident while Hambrick was a U.S. resi-
dent. 178 In other statements the staff has opined that a U.S. resident adviser using
the jurisdictional means to advise foreign clients generally would be required to
register, while a foreign adviser would not. 1
79
173. Id.
174. Id. at 468; see also TAC America Ltd. (1985) (LEXIS, Fed Sec library, No-Act file)
(no-action assurance based upon Double D. Management).
175. H. P. Hambrick Co., Inc., and Pajolo AG, 43 SEC Docket 577 (1988); see also T. Miller &
A. Ma, Registration of International Investment Advisers: New Uncertainty, INSIGTrrs, Apr. 1989, at
12 (analyzing Hambrick).
176. Hambrick, 43 SEC Docket at 578.
177. Id. at 579.
178. Double D. Management, Ltd., 43 SEC Docket 464 (1982) and Hambrick, 43 SEC Docket
at 578.
179. See Gim Seong Seow, 43 SEC Docket 519 (1987).
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The Study Release indicates that the staff is not drawing such a subtle dis-
tinction, but is applying the Richard Ellis test to commonly controlled affiliates.
The Study Release states that:
The Division of Investment Management takes the view that, once registered, a foreign
adviser is subject to all of the provisions of the Advisers Act with respect to both its
United States clients and its foreign clients.
To avoid Advisers Act regulation with respect to foreign clients, many foreign
advisers create a separate and independent United States registered subsidiary or affil-
iate to service United States clients. In determining whether a domestically registered
advisory subsidiary or affiliate of a foreign adviser operates as a separate independent
entity, one of the factors the Division of Investment Management considers is whether
the registered subsidiary or affiliate shares advisory personnel with the foreign entity.
If they share personnel, the Division may "look through" the registered entity and
apply the provisions of the Advisers Act to the foreign entity.'80
c. Criticism of the Commission
Staff's Interpretations
Some commentators have criticized the SEC staff's approach to the regulation
of foreign advisers. 181 These commentators generally argue that the Advisers Act
should not apply to the foreign advisory business of nonresident advisers. s2
Most argue that under international law and principles of comity the scope of the
Advisers Act's jurisdiction cannot be extended to such activities.1 8 3 They also
argue that the antifraud emphasis of the Advisers Act does not raise the types of
capital or other safety and soundness concerns that might justify such a broad
jurisdictional sweep. 184 Finally, they assert that foreign clients of foreign advis-
ers do not expect or seek the protection of the Advisers Act. 1
85
The Richard Ellis test also has been the subject of considerable criticism. 1 86
Commentators have complained most vociferously about the requirement that
the foreign and domestic affiliates employ different advisory personnel.
187
They argue that this requirement may prevent a foreign adviser from employ-
ing its most talented personnel on U.S. accounts and may require that the
U.S. affiliate distance itself from the expertise of the foreign affiliate, to the
U.S. clients' detriment.' 88 These detractors also assert that requiring the
180. Study Release, supra note 4, at 675 (footnote omitted).
181. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 154; Letter to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission Re: Reform of the Regulation of Investment Companies, from Debevoise &
Plimpton (Oct. 9, 1990) (letter on file at the SEC); Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 163; Dechert,
Price & Rhoads, Proposed Reform of the Regulation of Investment Companies (Oct. 15, 1990) (letter
on file at the SEC); Letter to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, Re:
Request for Comments on Reform of the Regulation of Investment Companies, from Citicorp/
Citibank (Oct. 10, 1990) (letter on file at the SEC).
182. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 158.
183. Id. at 24.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Davis, Polk & Wardwell, supra note 163, at 28.
187. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 158, at 27; Davis, Polk & Wardwell, supra note 163, at 28.
188. See, e.g., Davis, Polk & Wardwell, supra note 163, at 28.
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employment of separate personnel is often unduly expensive to the foreign
adviser. 189
These commentators generally have recommended territorial regulation of
foreign advisers. 190 Under this approach, the relationship between an adviser that
is not a U.S. resident (even though it is U.S.-registered) and its clients would be
governed by the law in which those clients reside. 19 1 U.S. resident advisers
would continue to be bound by U.S. law with respect to all of their clients, no
matter where they reside. 192 Most of the commentators also support a modifi-
cation of the Richard Ellis test to remove the requirement that the foreign and
domestic affiliates not share personnel. 19
3
The author also would prefer such an analysis to the staff's current position. 94
The territorial approach more closely approximates the reasonable expectations
of the nonresident adviser and its foreign clients, who have little reason to expect
the protections of the Advisers Act. The territorial approach probably should
require that foreign advisers refrain from advertising to their foreign clients that
they are registered in the United States. 195 If the foreign adviser advertises that
it is registered in the United States, then its foreign clients might assume that they
are protected by U.S. law.
The territorial approach also would have to be modified in the event that
section 7(d) of the 1940 Act is amended, to account for registration of foreign
funds, such as UCITS, and the public offering of their units in the United
States. Under current law, a foreign adviser to such a UCITS might have to
register under the Advisers Act. 196 Under the territorial approach, if the
UCITS resides only in the country of its organization, 1 97 then the relationship
189. Id. at 29.
190. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 158, at 27; Davis, Polk & Wardwell, supra note 163, at 29;
Dechert, Price & Rhoads, supra note 181, at 26.
191. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 158, at 28.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 158, at 28; Davis, Polk & Wardwell, supra note 163, at 29.
194. In the author's opinion, a territorial approach should be supplemented by some regulatory
arrangement or circumstance in the no-action request that would enable the SEC to investigate
possible front-running by the foreign adviser to the detriment of its U.S. clients, or violations of
U.S. law by a U.S. adviser acting through its foreign affiliate. See infra note 202 (discussing
application of § 208(d) to U.S. adviser with a foreign affiliate). Greene, Dupler, and Cohen would
limit their approach to advisers resident in (1) those countries with which the SEC has a
memorandum of understanding or treaty or (2) those countries in which the Commission believes
it otherwise has adequate access to information to carry out investigations of nonresident
registered advisers. Id.
195. Cf. Nikko Securities Investment Trust & Management Co., Ltd., 43 SEC Docket 491,
492. In Nikko, § 205 no-action assurance was granted to a foreign adviser based in part on
its representation that it would not publish outside the United States the fact of its U.S.
registration. Id.
196. See supra note 158 (discussing registration of UCITS' advisers).
197. Cf. UCITS Directive, supra note 3, § I, art 3. UCITS "situated" in Member State in which
the investment company or management company of the unit trust has its registered office. Id.
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between the UCITS and its foreign adviser would not be subject to the
Advisers Act. In some cases U.S. investors might expect that an adviser to a
registered UCITS is subject to the antifraud and other provisions of the Act,
particularly when the adviser has marketed the UCITS in the United States.
Subjecting the foreign adviser to the provisions of the Advisers Act might be
appropriate if the contacts between the adviser and the U.S. investors are
significant. 198
A territorial approach to the Advisers Act normally would alleviate the need
for a foreign adviser to establish a separate U.S. affiliate. If a foreign adviser
nevertheless chooses to do so, then the staff should rely on the territorial approach
rather than the more inflexible Ellis standards. The Advisers Act thus should apply
to all of the activities of the U.S. affiliate, but apply to the foreign adviser only
to the extent of its contacts with U.S. residents. 199 The Advisers Act primarily
regulates disclosure by an adviser to its clients. It does not impose capital re-
quirements, limit an adviser's affiliations, 200 or otherwise regulate the safety and
soundness of the adviser. Assuming that the U.S. affiliate makes all the required
disclosures, including disclosure concerning its foreign affiliate, 20 1 and complies
with the other requirements of the Advisers Act in its dealings with U.S. clients,
then no reason will exist to "look through" the U.S. adviser to its foreign af-
filiate.20 2 Regulation under the Advisers Act of the relationship between a U.S.
affiliate and its clients would provide all of the protections that are afforded to
clients of any registered adviser.
198. Cf. Hoguet, Muzinich (1988) (LEXIS, Fed Sec library, No-Act file). In Hoguet, Muzinich,
the staff granted § 203 no-action assurance with respect to a sub-adviser of a private group trust
offered to U.S. investors, when the sub-adviser would not have any direct dealings with the group
trust's participants. Id.
199. Even under the territorial approach, the U.S. affiliate would have to be a distinct organization
able to conduct its own advisory business. Otherwise, the foreign adviser could be deemed to be
advising the U.S. customers through the U.S. affiliate, or even could be considered to reside in the
affiliate's U.S. office.
200. Sections 203(e) and 203(f) of the Advisers Act authorize the Commission to bar persons
from association with a registered adviser based upon certain misconduct. Advisers Act, supra
note 58.
201. For example, Form ADV requires a U.S. adviser to disclose the identity of its controlling
persons, the judicial actions and custodial responsibilities of its affiliates, the adviser's main
source of information, and arrangements with a related adviser that are material to its advisory
business.
202. Of course, while the foreign affiliate generally should not be deemed to be acting through
the U.S. adviser, there may be circumstances in which the U.S. adviser is acting through its
foreign affiliate in violation of the Advisers Act. For example, a U.S. affiliate could, through the
foreign affiliate, engage in agency or principal cross-transactions in violation of § 206(3). Section
208(d) should apply to a U.S. adviser with a foreign affiliate just as it applies to any other
registered adviser. Advisers Act, supra note 58. And, as suggested above, a territorial approach
(and abandonment of Richard Ellis) should be supplemented by some regulatory arrangement or
circumstance in the no-action request that would enable the SEC to investigate possible violations
of U.S. law by a U.S. adviser acting through its foreign affiliate. See supra note 194.
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2. The United States Internal Revenue Code20 3
A UCITS' ability to offer its shares in the United States may be impaired by
several provisions of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code,2 °4 the most significant of
which are the passive foreign investment company (PFIC) provisions. 20 5 In
203. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Judd Kelly, attorney-adviser with the Office
of Tax Legislative Counsel, Department of the Treasury, for providing valuable technical assistance
concerning part I.C.2. of this article.
204. Of course, the tax laws of the UCITS' home country also may affect its ability to market
securities in the United States. For example, a UCITS may be required to withhold income distri-
butions to the U.S. shareholder. A discussion of the implications of home-country tax laws is beyond
the scope of this article.
205. A UCITS also could be subject to withholding tax if it chooses to invest in U.S.
companies. See supra text accompanying note 152. The Code generally imposes a 30 percent
withholding tax on all dividends (and interest received by certain persons) distributed by U.S.
issuers to foreign corporations, if those dividends are not "effectively connected" with the
corporations' trade or business within the United States. I.R.C. § 881(a) (West 1991); I.R.C.
§ 881(c) (West 1991). Capital gains recognized on the sale of securities and distributions of those
capital gains generally are exempt from the withholding tax. The Code defines "corporation" to
include "associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3)
(NCST 1991); see also I.R.C. § 301.7701-2 (discussing the meaning of "associations"). For
purposes of this tax discussion, this article assumes that a UCITS would be deemed to be a
corporation under the Code. If the country of the foreign shareholder has entered into a tax treaty
with the United States, then the'withholding tax may be reduced, generally to 10 or 20 percent. See
e.g., R. Pozen, R. Emerson, P. Harris, K. Monroe, Tax Issues 11-I (presented to the Investment
Company Institute Conference, "Europe: A Mutual Fund Marketing Roadmap") (Feb. 21, 1990)
(copy available from the author).
The term "trade or business within the United States" generally does not include trading in
stocks or securities through a resident broker or for the taxpayer's own account if at no time during
the taxable year the taxpayer has an office or the fixed place of business in the United States
"through which or by the direction of which" the transactions are effected. I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)
(West 1991). The IRS's rules generally except from the term "engaged in trade or business within
the United States" the effecting of securities transactions in the United States by a foreign
corporation, for its own account, that does not have its principal office in the United States. Treas.
Reg. § 1.864-2(c)(2)(iii), [1992] 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 27,022 (1992). The rules provide
criteria for determining when the foreign corporation's principal office is in the United States. Id. It
does not appear that by hiring a U.S. investment adviser alone would a UC1TS be deemed to have
its principal office in the United States. See Treas. Reg. § 1-864-2(c)(2)(iii), example (1), [1992] 7
Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 27,022 (1992). In this author's opinion, most UCITS would be
deemed to have their principal offices outside of the United States, and they would not be deemed to
be engaged in a trade or business in the United States.
A UCITS that invests in U.S. securities generally would be subject to the withholding tax for any
dividend distribution made by the issuers. Moreover, if the UCITS is not subject to tax in its home
country, then the UCITS generally may not invoke the benefits of a tax treaty. For example, because
funds organized in Belgium and Luxembourg generally are not subject to tax, then funds (including
UCITS) organized in those countries generally would be subject to the full 30 percent withholding
tax. See K. Monroe, Tax Issues Confronting an Investment Fund that Wants to Sell its Shares and
Invest its Assets Outside as Well as Inside its Country of Incorporation 111-45 (presented to the
Investment Company Institute Conference, "Europe: A Mutual Fund Marketing Roadmap")
(Feb. 21, 1990) (copy available from the author). If such a UCITS invests in U.S. securities, then
the applicable withholding tax would be 30 percent.
As discussed above, most UCITS that offer their units in the United States probably would not be
deemed to be engaged in a trade or business in the United States. If a UCITS were, then it would be
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many foreign countries investment funds are not required to distribute their
income and capital gains to their shareholders, and shareholders are not subjected
to tax liability for the capital gains recognized on the sale of their fund shares.
Shareholders in these countries generally prefer that the funds reinvest rather
than distribute their income and capital gains. The shareholders may then rec-
ognize the capital gain from the appreciation of their shares without incurring
significant tax liability.
206
By contrast, U.S. investment companies that elect to be "regulated investment
companies" (RICs) under the Code and qualify as RICs 20 7 generally must dis-
tribute 90 percent of their ordinary income and tax-exempt interest income for a
tax year.208 A RIC is allowed to deduct its dividends to shareholders and thus
pass its distributed net income to shareholders free of tax at the corporate
level.2 ° 9 Moreover, the RIC generally must distribute 98 percent of its taxable
income, including capital gains, or pay a 4 percent excise tax on the difference
between that amount and the amount distributed.21 °
Before 1986 U.S. shareholders generally could defer income tax by investing
in foreign funds that rolled up their earnings and gains rather than distributing
them to the shareholders. 211 The U.S. shareholders then might recognize capital
gains and owe tax at the lower capital gains rate when they sold their shares.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 added provisions to the Code that discourage this
tax deferral. 212 These provisions established the "passive foreign investment
company" (PFIC). A PFIC is generally defined as any foreign corporation if at
least 75 percent of its gross income for the taxable year is passive income or if
the average percentage of assets held by such corporation during the taxable year
that produce passive income or that are held for the production of passive income
taxable on its taxable income that is effectively connected with the trade or business. I.R.C. § 882
(West 1991). The term "trade or business within the United States" is generally defined the same
for § 882 as for § 881. See Treas. Reg. § 1-864-2(a), [1992] 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
27,022 (1992). All income of the UCITS that is "effectively connected" with its U.S. trade or
business would be subject to regular U.S. corporate tax rates.
206. See, e.g., Statement of David Silver, The Implications of "Europe 1992" for the U.S.
Mutual Fund Industry, on Behalf of the Investment Company Institute Before the Committee on
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives 8 (Jan. 30, 1990), H.R. Doc. No. 101-105, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1990).
207. A RIC generally must derive 90 percent of its income from securities or securities transac-
tions and meet the diversification tests in the Code. See generally I.R.C. § 851 (West 1991).
208. See I.R.C. § 852(a) (West 1991).
209. Id.
210. See I.R.C. § 4982 (West 1991).
211. This article will assume that ownership of the foreign investment companies and UCITS
under discussion is widely disbursed, and that they do not qualify as "controlled foreign corpora-
tions," see I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (West 1991), "foreign personal holding companies," see I.R.C.
§§ 551-558 (West 1991), or "foreign investment companies," see I.R.C. §§ 1246-1247 (West 1991),
under the Code.
212. See generally I.R.C. § § 1291-1297 (West 1991).
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is at least 50 percent. 213 The term "passive income" generally includes divi-
dends, interest, royalties, rents, annuities, certain property and commodities
transactions, and certain foreign currency gains. 214 It appears that most UCITS
would be deemed to be PFICs.
The PFIC provisions generally require a U.S. person to allocate ratably an
"excess distribution" to each day of the taxpayer's holding period.2 15 An "ex-
cess distribution" is generally the amount of distributions with respect to a
taxable year in excess of 125 percent of the average amount received in respect
of the stock by the taxpayer during the three preceding taxable years (or if
shorter, the portion of the taxpayer's holding period before the taxable year). 216
Gains recognized on dispositions of stock are treated as excess distributions. 21 7
If a United States person receives an excess distribution, then the person is
taxed on the excess distribution allocated to previous tax years at the highest rate
of tax applicable in those years. 21 8 The U.S. person also must pay interest on the
excess distribution allocated to the previous tax years. 219
The U.S. taxpayer may avoid this tax and interest on the deferred amount of
taxes by electing to treat the PFIC as a "qualified electing fund" (QEF). 220 If the
taxpayer owned PFIC stock on the first day of the taxable year in which the PFIC
became a QEF, then the taxpayer may elect to recognize a gain on the sale of
PFIC stock as if the taxpayer had sold it on the first day of the taxable year. 221
The taxpayer would pay all of the deferred taxes and interest, but acquire a new
basis and holding period.
Each year the QEF shareholder includes in gross income (as ordinary income)
the shareholder's pro rata share of the ordinary earnings of the QEF for the year
213. I.R.C. § 1296(a) (West 1991). The definition of "passive foreign investment company" is
indifferent to the concentration of fund share ownership. Cf. I.R.C. § 552 (West 1991) (defining
"foreign personal holding company" generally to include foreign corporations meeting a gross
income requirement and 50 percent of whose stock voting power is owned by five or fewer U.S.
citizens or residents); I.R.C. § 957 (West 1991) (defining "controlled foreign corporation" generally
to include any foreign corporation if more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power or
value of its stock is owned by U.S. shareholders); I.R.C. § 1246(b) (West 1991) (defining "foreign
investment company" generally to include registered investment companies in which U.S. persons
own 50 percent of the total voting power or value of stock).
214. I.R.C. § 1296(b) (West 1991); I.R.C. § 954(c) (West 1991).
215. I.R.C. § 1291(a)(l)(A) (West 1991).
216. I.R.C. § 1291(b)(2) (West 1991).
217. I.R.C. § 1291(a)(2) (West 1991).
218. I.R.C. § 1291(c)(2) (West 1991). Distributions other than excess distributions are treated as
otherwise provided by the Code. See generally I.R.C. § 1291 (West 1991).
219. I.R.C. § 1291(c)(3) (West 1991). The U.S. person must include in his gross income for the
current year the excess distribution allocated to the current year and the excess distribution allocated
to the pre-Tax Reform Act years of the taxpayer's holding period. I.R.C. § 1291(B) (West 1991).
Those amounts are not subject to the highest rate, nor must the taxpayer pay interest on those
amounts. I.R.C. § 1291(a)(1)(C) (West 1991) (tax on "deferred tax amount"); I.R.C. § 1291(c)
(West 1991) (definition of "deferred tax amount").
220. I.R.C. § 1295(b) (West 1991).
221. I.R.C. § 1291(d)(2) (West 1991).
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and (as long-term capital gains) the shareholder's pro rata share of the net capital
gains of the QEF for the year. 222 The taxpayer's basis is increased by these
amounts. 
223
By making a QEF election the taxpayer thus may calculate his taxes at current
rates and avoid interest on deferred tax amounts. The taxpayer generally does
subject himself to current taxation of the QEF's ordinary earnings and net capital
gain, regardless of whether they are distributed.224 The current tax treatment of
the QEF shareholder is comparable to the tax treatment of RIC shareholders. The
principal exception is that the QEF shareholder is currently taxed on undistributed
income of the QEF (unless the taxpayer elects to defer this tax) while the U.S.
investment company shareholder is generally taxed on actual distributions.
225
Despite the advantage to most U.S. taxpayers of a QEF election, in many
cases the Code will not permit such an election. The Code requires that the QEF
status be elected by the shareholder.226 The Internal Revenue Service requires an
electing shareholder to file a PFIC Annual Information Statement with the tax-
payer's return.227 The shareholder obtains this statement from the PFIC. It in-
cludes information concerning the shareholder's pro rata share of the PFIC's
ordinary earnings and net capital gain for the year, amounts distributed to the
shareholder, and a statement that the PFIC will allow the shareholder to inspect
and copy the PFIC's books, records, and other documents necessary to establish
that the PFIC's ordinary earnings and net capital gain are calculated according to
U.S. income tax principles.
228
Most UCITS probably would not agree to supply a PFIC Annual Information
Statement or to open their books to shareholders and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice. 229 Therefore, a U.S. shareholder of a UCITS normally would be taxed as
a PFIC shareholder, without the ability to make a QEF election. The interest
charges on deferred tax and the imposition of that tax at the highest rates prob-
ably would deter most U.S. investors from purchasing interests in UCITS.
One possible method to remove the deterrent PFIC provisions without per-
mitting the deferral of income by U.S. taxpayers would be to permit a UCITS to
222. I.R.C. § 1293(a)(1) (West 1991). Amounts that were previously taxed to any U.S. taxpayer
generally are distributed tax-free. I.R.C § 1293(c) (West 1991).
223. I.R.C., § 1293(d) (West 1991). The basis is also decreased by the amounts distributed
tax-free under I.R.C. § 1293(c).
224. The taxpayer may elect to defer taxes on most undistributed amounts, but must pay interest
on these deferred taxes. I.R.C. § 1294 (West 1991).
225. Of course, the Code as a practical matter forces U.S. investment companies to distribute all
of their income and capital gains. See supra text accompanying note 206 (discussing distribution
requirements).
226. I.R.C. § 1295(b) (West 1991).
227. IRS Notice 88-125, [1991 Transfer Binder] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 33,102 (1991).
228. Id.
229. See Albert Francke, Md, Capital Flows Between Countries: Reciprocal Arrangements for the
Sale of Shares in Mutual Funds, 1987 COLUMat Bus. L. REV. 365, 373 (1987) (discussing "intru-
sive" IRS methods of determining stock ownership).
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be taxed as if it were a RIC. 2 30 As of the date this article is being written, two
bills pending in Congress, H.R. 2777 and S. 1394, would permit a new entity,
a "passive foreign corporation" (PFC), to elect to be treated as a RIC. 23 A PFC
may make this election only if: (1) it would qualify as a RIC if it were a domestic
corporation; (2) it meets such requirements as the Secretary of the Treasury may
set to ensure the collection of taxes; and (3) the PFC waives all benefits under
any treaty (tax or otherwise).
A UCITS that elected RIC status under the legislation presumably would have
to distribute currently all of its income, including the income attributable to the
pro rata interest of foreign investors. Even if a UCITS were permitted to distribute
only the income attributable to the pro rata interest of U.S. taxpayers, it probably
would be difficult for a UCITS to allocate distributions in this way. 232 Moreover,
the Secretary's requirements referred to in the standards for election undoubtedly
would include the submission of the UCITS' books to IRS examination.
The establishment of mirror funds will continue to be the only practical
method for a UCITS to overcome the obstacles in the Tax Code to entry into the
U.S. market. By establishing a mirror fund the UCITS could separate the RIC
treatment of the U.S. fund from the roll-up feature of the UCITS. It also would
avoid the harsh PFIC regime and the examination of its books by the IRS.
IL Conclusion
Although section 7(d) is an impediment to the offer of foreign fund shares in
the United States, it is considerably less significant than other barriers. The
inefficiencies of establishing a mirror fund pale in comparison to certain funda-
mental inconsistencies between the 1940 Act and foreign regulation, the poten-
tial subjection of UCITS advisers to the jurisdiction of the Advisers Act with
respect to all of their clients, and, most of all, the impracticality of submitting the
funds to the PFIC regime. Nor can these issues easily be resolved for UCITS by
any reciprocal arrangement. The multi-layered structure of European Commu-
nity regulation would complicate negotiations aimed at facilitating cross-border
movements of investment company shares. The only vehicle for the entry of
foreign funds in the United States for the foreseeable future will be the mirror
fund. Only by establishing a mirror fund can one hope to overcome, at a rela-
tively small cost, the significant obstacles to entry into the United States market.
230. As discussed above, a RIC must be a domestic corporation. I.R.C. § 851 (West 1991).
231. The bills generally would simplify the foreign personal holding company and PFIC regimes
by creating a single definition of a PFC. A PFC would be any foreign corporation if (1) 60 percent
or more of its income is passive income (which generally would be defined as it is today), (2) 50
percent or more of its assets produce passive income or are held for the production of passive income,
or (3) it is registered under the 1940 Act either as a management company or a unit investment trust.
232. A UCITS could issue a separate class or series of units to be offered in the United States.
Such an arrangement would have to be structured to comply with § 18(f) of the 1940 Act, which
generally prohibits the issuance of "senior securities."
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